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RETROACTIVE CIVIL LEGISLATION

Laura Ricciardi*and Michael B. W Sinclair"
INTRODUCTION

N June, 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the federal government's
retroactive revision of an estate tax law, leaving the estate of Willametta K.
Day with a $631,000 loss.' Despite the loss being the direct result of the late
Ms. Day's executor, Jerry Carlton, acting in reliance on the correct and only
reading of the onginal statute, 2 the Supreme Court held that the retroactive
amendment was neither harsh nor oppressive 3 because "Congress' purpose in
enacting the amendment was neither illegitimate nor arbitrary " The Court only
required that Congress' purpose be reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental
purpose in order for the retroactive legislation to pass constitutional
5
muster.
What a pretty pass we have come to. A little more than twenty years ago
Justice Marshall wrote for a unanimous Court m Grayned v. City of Rockford "
[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct,
we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly
[and] must provide
explicit standards for those who apply them.7

This is redolent with decency, the sort of decency we all believe the founding
fathers built into the Constitution, the sort of decency society should be founded
on. But, sadly, the 1994 Supreme Court seemed to have little more than
expediency on its mind in Carlton. Justice Scalia accurately described it as "baitand-switch taxation" but nevertheless concurred with the decision

*

J.D. New York Law School, 1996.

Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. United States v. Carlton, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2024 (1994), rev g Carlton v. United States, 972

**

F.2d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 1992).
2. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2023 ('Carlton's reliance is uncontested--and the reading of the

original statute on which he relied appears to have been correct.").
3. Id. at 2022.
4. Id. at 2023.
5.
6.

Id.
408 U.S. 104 (1972).

7

Id. at 108.

Although there were concumng opinions, on this part the Court was

unanimous.
8. Carlton, 114 S.Ct. at 2026-27 (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority opinion was authored
by Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and
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Despite its never expressly saying so, the reasoning in Carlton makes it clear
that the Supreme Court has changed its jurisprudence of retroactive legislation.
At such a juncture, a summary and assessment is called for. The history and
variety of prior arguments and decisions needs to be surveyed and summarized.
The nature and extent of the Court's jurisprudential change need to be articulated
clearly and the consequences estimated. These are the goals of this article.
The Constitution contains prohibitions aFainst the enactment of ex post facto
laws at both the federal and state level. Part I covers the history of the
interpretation of ex post facto laws, from the arguments over the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution, through the establishment of the bifurcated
approach to criminal and civil law.'0 Part II traces the development of
alternative grounds for policing retroactive civil legislation, up to the Supreme
Court's 1994 decision in Carlton. Part III examines Carlton against the
background of this century's retroactive tax cases. Part IV concludes the article
with a summary of the potential consequences should Carlton and its standard
survive as law and offers a framework for an alternative analysis more in keeping
with equity and tradition.
I. THE EARLY UNITED STATES HISTORY, FROM THE ARGUMENTS OVER THE
DRAFTING OF THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE BIFURCATED APPROACH TO CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LAW

A.

The ConstitutionalConvention

The U.S. Constitution, in Sections 9 and 10 of Article I, expressly prohibits
both federal and state governments from enacting ex post facto laws. These
sections provide:
No bill of attainder or ex postfacto law shall be passed."
No state shall
pass any bill of attainder, ex postfacto law, or law impairing the
12
obligation of contracts
Although the ban on ex post facto legislation has come to be interpreted as
reaching criminal law only, it is a legitimate
question whether or not that was the
13
interpretation intended by the Framers.
Ginsburg. Id. at 2020-24. Justice O'Connor concurred separately. Id. at 2024-26 (O'Connor, J.,
concurng). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also concurred separately. Id. at 2026-27
(Scalia, J., concumng).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, cl. 3, 10, cl. 1.

10. It is now settled that the ex post facto prohibitions do not reach civil law. See Oliver P
Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 MICH. L. REV 315, 315 (1921) ("This doctrine of
Calder v. Bull is so well settled as to have become one of the commonplaces of Amencan

constitutional law.").
11.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.

12.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.

13.

See generally Field, supra note 10, at 317-22 (describing the legislative debates during
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At the constitutional convention there was considerable sentiment about having
no mention of ex post facto laws in the Constitution. As Madison records, on
Wednesday, August 22, 1787, the following was said at the convention:
Mr. Gerry and Mr. McHenry moved to insert, after the second Section Article 7
the clause following, to wit: "The legislative shall pass no bill of attainder, nor any
ex post facto law.""'
Mr. Gerry urged the necessity of this prohibition, which he said was greater m
the National than the State Legislature; because the number of members m the
former being fewer, they were on that account the more to be feared.
Mr. Gouveneur Moms thought the precaution as to ex post facto laws are
necessary but essential as to bills of attainder. 5
Mr. Ellsworth contended that there was no lawyer, no civilian, who would not
say that ex post facto laws were void of themselves. It cannot, then, be necessary
to prohibit them.
Mr. Wilson was against inserting anything in the constitution, as to ex post facto
laws. It will bring reflection on the constitution and proclaim that we are ignorant
of the
first principles of legislation, or our constitutional government that will be
16
SO.

The section relating to bills of attainder was agreed to without dissent. Bills of
attainder are retrospective laws and clearly are criminal only 17 Would they have
drawn such a sharp distinction between bills of attainder and ex postfacto laws
if the latter, too, were thought to pertain only to criminal laws? But discussion
of the ex post facto prohibition continued:
Mr. Carroll remarked that experience overruled all other calculations. It had
proved that, in whatever light they mght be viewed by civilians or others the State
Legislatures had passed them, and they had taken effect."'

consideration of the ex post facto legislation).
14. Here the editor of Madison's papers footnotes the following: "The proceedings on this
motion, involving the two questions on attainders and ex postfacto laws, are not so fully stated in
the printed Journal." 3 JAMES

MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, PURCHASED BY ORDER
OF CONGRESS: BEING His CORRESPONDENCE AND REPORTS OF DEBATES DURING THE CONGRESS
OF THE CONFEDERATION AND HIS REPORTS OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 1399

(Henry D. Gilpin ed., 1840) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS].
15. Id. at 1399-1400. Madison's notes, as well as the notes of others present at the
Convention, can also be found m 1 WILBOURN E. BENTON, 1787- DRAFTING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 983-86 (1986); 2 MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, 375-76 (rev. ed. 1966).
16.. 3 MADiSON PAPERS, supra note 14, at 1400; JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL
CONvENTION 586 (E.H. Scott ed., 1893) [hereinafter MADISON JOURNAL].
17 Bills of attainder are "[s]uch special acts of the legislature as inflict capital punishments
upon persons supposed to be guilty of high offenses, such as treason and felony, without any
conviction in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127 (6th
ed. 1990).
18. 3 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 14, at 1400.
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Could he have been talking about criminal laws only? The discussion continued:
Mr. Wilson. If these prohibitions in the State Constitutions have no effect, it will
be useless to insert them m this Constitution. Besides, both sides will agree to the
principle, but will differ as to its application.
Mr. Williamson. Such a prohibitory clause is in the Constitution of North
Carolina; and though it has been violated, it has done good there, and may do good
here, because the Judges can take hold of it.
Dr. Johnson thought the clause unnecessary, and implying an improper suspicion
of the national legislature.
Mr. Rutledge was in favor of the clause."
McHenry's notes for the same day are more condensed:
Gouverneur Moms Willson Dr. Johnson etc thought the first [prohibition of ex
post facto laws] an unnecessary guard as the principles of justice law et[c] were a
perpetual bar to such. To say that the legislature shall not pass an ex post facto law
is the same as to declare they shall not do a thing contrary to common sense-that
they shall not cause that to be a crime which is no crime.2'
On Tuesday, August 28, 1787, Madison recorded the following [Colonel Mason
had been talking about the need for the federal government to interfere with
contracts, for example, in statutes of limitations on promissory notes]:
Mr. Wilson. The answer to these objections is, that retrospective interferences
only are to be prohibited.
Mr. Madison. Is not that already done by the prohibition of ex post facto laws
which will oblige the Judges to declare interferences null and void?2'
Of this exchange, Field wrote:
[Madison] is evidently of the impression that ex post facto applies to civil as well
as to cnmmal matters. It is odd that no member of the Convention took the trouble
to inform him that he was laboring under a serious misapprehension.'
The discussion continued:
Mr. Rutledge moved instead of Mr. King's motion, to insert "nor pass bills of
23
attainder nor retrospective laws
19. Id., 2 FARRAND, supra note 15, at 376.
20.

1 BENTON, supra note 15, at 987

The note apparently uses crime as an example only

(although this might be disputed) since no mention had yet been made to limit ex post facto laws
to criminal laws only. It is somewhat similar in this respect to the popular passage from
Blackstone. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46. See also infra notes 33-34.
21. 1 BENTON, supra note 15, at 1084; 2 FARRAND,supra note 15, at 440; MADISON JOURNAL,
supra note 16, at 621.

22. Field, supra note 10, at 319.
23. 1BENTON, supra note 15, at 1084; 2

FARRAND,supra note 15, at 440; MADISON JOURNAL,
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Rutledge's motion carred, seven to three.24 At this stage it seems fairly clear
that the prohibition of ex post facto legislation was understood to apply to both
civil law and criminal law. It is clear, for example, that Madison and Wilson
were using 'expostfacto and 'retrospective' as synonyms, interchangeably 25
However, that night, Mr. Dickinson, "a lawyer of repute," 6 did some
homework, the results of which Madison reported the next day, Wednesday,
August 29, 1787"
Mr. Dickinson mentioned to the House that on examining Blackstone's
Commentaries, he found that the term "ex postfacto" related to criminal cases only;

that they would not consequently restrain the States from retrospective laws in civil
cases; and then some further proposition would be requisite."
If Dickinson thought this limited, criminal connotation was generally understood,
would he have made this pronouncement? There is no indication that his reliance
on Blackstone was held authoritative at that time and controlling of the meaning
of this language in the inchoate constitution. Field-who uses "in the technical
sense" as meaning "ex postfacto" restricted to criminal laws only-wrote:
It is hard to escape the conclusion that at least the members of the convention did
not have in mind the technical meaning of ex post facto laws.28
When the subject came up again, Friday, September 14, 1787, the exchange
suggests a stand-off, both as to meamng and intent:
Colonel Mason moved to strike out from the clause (Article 1, Sect. 9,) "No bill
of attainder, nor any ex postfacto law, shall be passed," the words nor any "ex post

facto" law. He thought it not sufficiently clear that the prohibition meant by this
phrase was limted to cases of a criminal nature; and no Legislature ever did or can
altogether avoid them in Civil Cases.

Mr. Gerry seconded the motion; but with a view to extend the prohibition to
"civil cases," which he thought ought to be done. 9

supra note 16, at 621.
24.

MADISON JoUR-NAL, supra note 16, at 621 ("On which motion,-New Hampshire, New

Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-7; Connecticut,
Maryland, Virginia, no--3."). See 1 BENTON, supra note 15, at 1084; 2 FARRAND, supra note 15,
at 440; 3 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 14, at 1400,

25. As to Madison's report of the difference between his report and that of the printed record,
Farrand argues on the basis of other memoirs that the record, not Madison's report, was accurate.
See 2 FARRAND, supra note 15, at 440 n.19. This merely emphasizes the lack of a distinction m
the usage of those present.
26.
27.

Field, supra note 10, at 320.
MADISON JOURNAL, supra note 16, at 625-26; 3 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 14, at 1400.

28. Field, supra note 10, at 320.
29. MADISON JOURNAL, supra note 16, at 727-28. See 1 BENTON, supra note 15, at 1004; 2
FARRAND, supra note 15, at 617; 3 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 14, at 1578.
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On the basis of records of the

[The Framers] did not give evidence of using the term ex post facto in a technical
sense. The tendency seemed to be to impart a civil meaning to the term; there is
no evidence of the term being used in different connections.'
It is worth examining what Blackstone actually wrote that motivated Mr.
3 and later bolstered
Dickinson and Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist,
facto prohibition. 32
post
ex
the
on
significant arguments of the Supreme Court
As will be seen, it scarcely justifies the restricted interpretation we have been left
with. Blackstone wrote:
There is still a more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws
ex postfacto; when after an action (indifferent in itself) is committed, the legislator
then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment
upon the person who has committed it. Here it is impossible that the party could
foresee that an action, innocent when it was done, should be afterwards be
converted to guilt by a subsequent law- he had therefore no cause to abstain from
it, and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and unjust.
All laws should therefore be made to commence n ftoro, and be notified before
33
their commencement; which is implied m the term "prescribed."
The criminal punishment here is an illustrative argument, not a limitation. No
one doubts that the most egregious abuse of retroactive legislation would be
criminal.
That the reasoning is completely general can be seen from the immediately
preceding passage, which is focussed on the need for notice so that denizens can
follow governmental edicts.
It is likewise "a rule prescribed." Because a bare resolution, confined in the
breast of the legislator, without manifesting itself by some external sign, can never
be properly a law. It is requisite that this resolution be notified to the people who
are to obey it. But the manner in which this notification is to be made, is matter
of very great indifference. It may be notified, viva voce, by officers appointed for
that purpose, as is done with regard to proclamations, and such acts of parliament
as are appointed [46] to be publicly read in churches and other assemblies. It may
lastly be notified by writing, printing, or the like; which is the general course taken
with all our acts of parliament. Yet, whatever way is made use of, it is incumbent
on the promulgators to do it in the most public and perspicuous manner; not like

30.

Field, supra note 10, at 321.

31. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 629 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C.Hamilton ed., 1877).
32.

See Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 58

U.S. (17 How.) 456, 463 (1854); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.

(1 Dall.) 386, 396 (1798).
33. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *46.
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Caligula, who (according to Dio Cassius) wrote his laws m a very small character,
and hung them upon high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people.
Neither Blackstone's argument nor the emperor Caligula's practice was limited
to criminal laws. Blackstone's only limitation m this paragraph is that the action
subject to the retroactive legislation be "indifferent in itself."3 That is, that the
action not be something the common law, or common morality, would constrain
without the aid of statute. The restriction then is on the sort of statute that gives
notice otherwise unavailable, and not merely declaratory of common law.36 Nor
need we take this analysis of Blackstone's writing as peculiar to the late twentieth
century Justice Johnson, in his commentary on the meaning of the term "ex post
facto" following the 1829 case Satterlee v. Matthewson," made these very
arguments and more.38
Further evidence of the generally accepted meamng of ex postfacto entertained
by the politically active in 1787 comes from a letter by Messrs. Ellsworth (later
to become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) and Sherman to the Governor of
Connecticut about the draft constitution. Regarding the restraints on states'
issuing paper money, Ellsworth and Sherman included the language: "or
impairing the obligation of contract by ex post facto laws."39 Clearly this use
of ex postfacto could not be limited to criminal laws only
Among the writings of those opposed to the constitution, there is a curious
argument, indicative of a broader understanding of the scope of ex post facto.
One letter writer, "Centinel", specifically opposed the inclusion of the ex post
facto prohibition.' Generally, he argued, governments ought not pass ex post
facto laws "as they are generally injurious and fraudulent: Yet there are
occasions when such laws are not only just but highly requisite. ' i His example
was that "the Congress under the new constitution are precluded from all controul
34. Id. at **4546.
35. Id. at *46.
36. See Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of
Jurisprudence,20 MINN. L. REv. 775, 777 (1936).
37. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416 n.a (1829) (Johnson, J., concurring).
38. Justice Johnson's commentary begins by giving a brief history of linguistic usage of the
term ex post facto. Id. at 416a-b n.a. Foliowing this lingmstic history, he continues with a long
inventory of secondary sources. Id. at 416b n.a. Then he uses recent precedent, and he quotes
Justice Raymond to the effect that he would not apply a stock registration statute retroactively. Id.
at 416b n.a (citing Wilkinson v. Meyer, 88 Eng. Rep. 127 (K.B. 1723)).
The case is authority to three points; 1st, To show that the phrase is used in a sense equally
applicable to contracts and to crimes. 2d, That it was applied to statutes affecting contracts.
And 3d, That as late as Lord Raymond's time, it had not received a practical or technical
construction, which confined it to criminal cases.
Id. See Field, supra note 10, at 327-30.
39. 3 FARRAND, supra note 15, at 99-100; Field, supra note 10, at 331.
40. CENTINEL, AN ESSAY TO THE PEOPLE OF PENNSYLVANIA (Feb. 23, 1788), reprintedin 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 197, 198 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
41. Id.
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[sic] over transactions pnor to its establishment," which will leave "public
42
defaulters" with "unaccountable millions" of uncollectible United States debt.
Apparently some believed that the prohibition was placed in the constitution
precisely for the purpose of relieving such debtors of their obligations to the
federal government. One writer, named "a Countryman," clearly took this to be
Centmel's argument: "[li]owsomever, my old neighbour from Pennsylvania tells
me, that this ex post facto law business was put in, not because it was a bad
thing, but to place it out of our power of calling to account, people who have the
public monies in their hands
-43 These arguments may look implausible at
first glance, but they presuppose an understanding of the ex postfacto prohibition
in accord with that of almost everyone at the convention, at least, namely, that it
reached civil as well as cnminal legislation.
The appearance of paranoia in these anti-federalist arguments is dispelled when
one reviews the records of the state ratifying conventions. The ex post facto
prohibition caused a lively debate in Virginia, and it was entirely to do with the
redemption of Continental paper dollars." Continental dollars counted as
governmental debts, promissory notes of the government, but they had depreciated
greatly, according to George Mason "to a thousand for one."4' Some states and
some individuals had vast hordes of the paper, 46 presently worthless, but if
redeemed at face value, worth an amount which "will surpass the value of the
property of the United States. '47 The states of course recognized that to redeem
the paper in specie would require a tax falling on them. 4s What the states

42. Id.
43. A Countryman, (untitled), N.Y JOURNAL, Jan. 17, 1788, reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 86, 86 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
44. For a record of the debate, see 3 JONATHON ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 460-81 (J.B. Lipincott ed., 1941)

(2d ed. 1836).
45.

Id. at 472.

46.

At the time, Patrick Henry:

asked gentlemen who had been in high authority, whether there were not some state
speculations on this matter. He had been informed that some states had acquired vast
quantities of that money, which they would be able to recover in its nominal value of the
other states.
Mr. MADISON admitted there might be some speculations on the subject. He believed
the old Continental money was settled in a very disproportionate manner.

Id. at 471.
47 Id. at 473. Mr. Henry said, "[h]ere is an enourmous demand, which your children, to the
tenth generation, will not be able to pay." Id. at 474.
48. Id. at 471. Mr. Henry's fear was:
As they [the states] could not emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver corn a
tender in payment of debts, pass ex post facto laws, or impair the obligation of

contracts,-though these restrictions were founded on good principles, yet he feared they
would have this effect; that this state would be obliged to pay for her share of the
Continental money, shilling for shilling.
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wanted was called a scaling law, making the paper worth only its market value,
rather than its face value. However, this would be an ex post facto law,
accordingly prohibited. James Madison replied to Patrick Henry's opening
salvo, 49 but in terms of Article 6, and without mention of the ex post facto
prohibition." The reply seems peculiarly inapt, for Article 6 seems only to
reinforce the obligation to redeem in specie, exactly what was causing the
problem. What was needed was an ex postfacto law devaluing the Continental
paper dollars, but that was prohibited by the proposed constitution. George
Mason stated all this in no uncertain terms."

Madison's response was to defend

Id.
49.

Mr. Henry's concern was that:

[The states] could not emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver corn a tender
in payment of debts, pass ex post facto laws, or impair the obligation of contracts,-though
these restrictions were founded on good pnnciples, yet he feared they would have this effect;
that this state would be obliged to pay for her share of the Continental money, shilling for
shilling. He asked gentlemen who had been in high authority, whether there were not some
state speculations on this matter. He had been informed that some states had acquired vast
quantities of that money, which they would be able to recover in its nominal value of the
other states.
Id. at 471.
50. Id. at 471-72. Mr. Madison's argument proceeded as follows:
Mr. Madison admitted there might be some speculations on the subject. He believed the old
Continental money was settled in a very disproportionate manner. It appeared to him,
however, that it was unnecessary to say anything on this point, for there was a clause in the
Constitution which cleared it up. The first clause of the 6th article provides that "all debts
contracted, and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be
as valid against the United States, under this Constitution, as under the Confederation." He
affirmed that it was meant there should be no change with respect to claims by this political
alteration; and that the public would stand, with respect to their creditors, as before. He
thought that the validity of claims ought not to diminish by the adoption of the Constitution.
But, however, it could not increase the demands on the public.

Id. See 3 FARRAND, supra note 15, at 327-28.
51.

See 3 ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 472-73. Mr, Mason's argument concerned the following:

The clause which has been read, as a sufficient security, seemed to him satisfactory as far
as it went; that is, that the Continental money ought to stand on the same ground as it did
previously, or that the claim should not be impaired.
The money had at last depreciated
to a thousand for one. The intention of state speculation, as well as individual speculation,
was to get as much as possible of that money, in order to recover its nominal value. The
means, says he, of settling this money, were in the hands of the old Congress. They could
discharge it at its depreciated value. Is there that means here? No, sir, we must pay at
shilling for shilling, or at least at the rate of one for forty. The amount will surpass the value
of the property of the Umted States. Neither the state legislatures nor Congress can make
an ex post facto law. The nominal value must therefore be paid. Where is the power in the
new government to settle this money so as to prevent the country from being amined? When
they prohibit the making of ex post facto laws, they will have no authority to prevent our
being runmed by paying that money at its nominal value.
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Article 6, but still he made no mention of Article I, Sections 9 or 10.52 Henry
came right back, eloquent, if prolix:
The question ansing on the clause before you is, whether an act of the legislature
of this state, for scaling money, will be of sufficient validity to exonerate you from
paying the nominal value, when such a law, called ex post facto, and impairing the
obligation of contracts, is expressly interdicted by it. Your hands are tied up by this
clause, and you must pay shilling for shilling; and, in the last section, there is a
clause that prohibits the general legislature from passing any ex post facto law; so
that the hands of Congress are tied up, as well as the hands of the state legislatures
laws, and
This money might be scaled, sir; but the exclusion of ex postfacto
53
laws impairing the obligation of contracts, steps in and prevents It.
There can be no mistaking that all who had spoken so far, Patrick Henry, James
Madison, George Mason, and George Nicholas,' had no doubt that the proposed
constitution's ex postfacto prohibitions extended to this civil matter.
At this stage, Governor Randolph entered the fray, arguing strenuously that
there was no danger because the ex post facto prohibition applied to "criminal
matters alone. ' 5 5 Randolph stated, "[eix post facto laws, if taken technically,
[because] [t]he same clause provides that no
relate solely to criminal cases
bill of attainder shall be passed. It shows that the attention of the Convention
was drawn to criminal matters alone."' 6 He then continued to argue that the
Continental dollars were debts of the federal Congress, not of the states, so the
states' inability to make scaling laws because of the prohibition on impairing the
obligation of contracts did not matter.57 The Congress could make an ex post
facto law " George Mason replied with an harangue:

Without some security against it, we shall be compelled to pay it to the last particle of our

property. Shall we ruin our people by taxation, from generation to generation, to pay that
money 9 Should any ex post facto law be made to relieve us from such payments, it would
The clause
not be regarded, because post facto laws are interdicted in the Constitution.
under consideration does away the pretended security of the clause which was adduced by

the honorable gentleman. This enourmous mass of worthless money, which has been offered
at a thousand for one, must be paid in actual gold and silver at the nominal value.

Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 473.
Id. at 473-75.
9 No, sir!").
Id. at 477 ("Have they the right to make ex post facto laws
Id.
Id. See 3 FAIRtAND, supra note 15, at 328. The argument so obviously fails to prove the

ex post facto prohibition is exclusively criminal as to look disingenuous; in the adjacent section 10,
considered concurrently, the ex post facto provision was adjacent to the obviously commercial

interdiction of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Equally then, the Convention was
focusing on civil matters alone.
57 3 ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 478-79.
58. Id.
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They cannot pay it any other way than according to the nominal value; for they are
prohibited from making ex post facto laws; and it would be ex post facto, to all
intents and purposes, to pay of creditors with less than the nominal sum which they
were onginally promised. But the honorable gentleman has called to his aid
technical definitions. He says, that ex post facto laws relate solely to criminal
matters. I beg leave to differ from him. Whatever it may be at the bar, or m a
professional line, I conceive that, according to the common acceptation of the
words, ex post facto laws and retrospective laws are synonymous terms. Are we
to trust business of this sort to technical definition? The contrary is the plain
meaning of the words. Congress has no power to scale money
Whatever may
be the professional meaning, yet the general meaning for ex postfacto law is an act
having retrospective operation. This construction is agreeable to its primary
etymology Will it not be the duty of the federal court to say that such laws are
prohibited? This goes to the destruction and annihilation of all citizens of the
United States, to enrich a few. Are we to part with every shilling of our property,
and be reduced to the lowest insignificancy, to aggrandize a few speculators?59
Madison replied again, very calmly, but again without mentioning ex post facto
laws. 60 Mason and Randolph had another brief and rather desultory exchange,
adding nothing, and the discussion moved to the prohibition on states' laying
import or export tariffs. 6 1
In North Carolina, the problem seems to have been not so much the
Continental paper dollars, but the state's own paper. Mr. Cabarrus and Mr.
Bloodworth raised the issue, asking "if the payment of sums now due be ex post
facto?"62 The reply is striking, as it came from Mr. Iredell, later a Justice on the
Supreme Court, one of the four justices to decide Calder v Bull. Iredell replied:
There is nothing in the Constitution which affects our present paper money It
prohibits, for the future, the emitting of any, but it does not interfere with the paper
money now actually in circulation in several states. There is an express clause
which protects it. It provides that there shall be no ex postfacto law This would
be ex post facto, if the construction contended for [by Carbarrus] were right.63
The ex post facto prohibition was mentioned at only one other state ratifying
convention, New York's. There, a Mr. Lansing proposed an amendment
confining the ban on ex post facto legislation to criminal laws only, so that it
"shall not be construed to prevent calling public defaulters to account."' Such
a proposal, of course, only makes sense if the general understanding was
otherwise. As Field wrote, the records of the state conventions only confirm the

59. Id.
60. Id. at 480-81.
61. Id. at 481-82.
62.
63.
64.

4 ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 184. Mr. Carbarrus suggested that it was. Id.
Id. at 185.
2 ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 407.
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inescapable impression we get from the records of the federal convention: "One
can hardly feel that the term ex post facto was intended to be limited to criminal
6
In fact, only
cases when it was embodied in the text of the Constitution."'
Dickinson, Randolph, and Lansing mentioned a restricted meaning and many
others spoke in terms that could only make sense in the broader meaning that
includes civil legislation at least as much as criminal. Those present day scholars
who advocate interpreting the Constitution only according to the original meaning
of its terms should, accordingly, have to acquiesce in a non-restrictive meaning
of the ex post facto provisions.'
B.

Early Cases Defining the Scope of Ex Post Facto

1.

Calder v Bull

It was not long before any doubt about whether the scope of the ex post facto
prohibition included civil legislation was resolved by the Supreme Court. Calder
v. Bull67 is usually considered to be the origin of the accepted interpretation of
the constitution's ban on ex post facto laws in Article I, Sections 9 and 10,
applying only to criminal laws. As such, it is hardly a very sound basis for such
a severe limitation on our rights, or correspondingly, such an expansion of
governmental power.
On March 21, 1793, the Court of Probate for Hartford, Connecticut, refused to
admit the will of Normand Morrison to probate. 68 That meant that certain lands
that Momson had devised to Mrs. Bull would instead pass by intestate succession
to Mrs. Calder.69 However, "[t]he legislature of Connecticut, on the 2d
set aside [that]
Thursday of May, 1795, passed a resolution or law, which,
decree."" The probate court held a new hearing at which it admitted the will
and the land went to Mrs. Bull. 71 The Calders appealed through the Connecticut
appellate courts, but to no avail.' They sought relief in the U.S. Supreme

65. Field, supra note 10, at 327.
66. Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed to take this position in interpreting the application of the
ex post facto prohibition to criminal cases when he wrote: "Neither of these decisions in our view
is consistent with the understanding of the term 'ex post facto law' at the time the Constitution
was adopted." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 47 (1990) (citing Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S.
343 (1898); Krmg v Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883)). This is a ground for objecting to the position
held m those cases and narrowing it now! Justice Thomas has also declared his desire for
consistency with the framers' intentions. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642-51
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Quite generally, Robert Bork writes that in judicial interpretation,
"[a]ll that counts is how the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time

[of enactment]."

ROBERT H. BORIK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA. THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF

THE LAW 144 (1990).
67 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
68. Id. at 386.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Court, claiming that the Connecticut legislature's action of the second Thursday
of May, 1795, was a violation of Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution. Z
As presented by the Court, "[t]he sole inquiry is, whether this resolution or law
of Connecticut, having such operation [divesting Calder and wife], is an ex post
facto law, within the prohibition of the federal constitution?" 74
However, this was not the only question, nor the only grounds, upon which the
decision of the Connecticut courts was affirmed. Early colomal Connecticut had
no separate courts of appeal. The legislature filled that role exclusively until
1762. 5 In 1762, the Connecticut legislature created an appellate system.76 As
was, by a legislative
Justice Paterson put it, the power "of granting new trials
act, imparted to the superior and county courts.

' 77

But that act created

concurrent only, not exclusive appellate jurisdiction in those courts; the legislature
did not give up its traditional appellate junsdiction. Justice Paterson stated:
But the act does not remove or annihilate the pre-existing power of the legislature,
m this particular; it only communicates to other authorities a concurrence of
jurisdiction, as to the awarding of new trials. And the fact is, that the legislature
have, in two instances, exercised this power, since the passing of the law m 1762.
undefined authority,
They acted in a double capacity, as a house of legislation,
78 with
and also as a court of judicature, m certain exigencies.
As Justice Iredell pointed out, appellate authority in a legislative body is not so
strange. "In England, we know that one branch of the parliament, the House of
Lords, not only exercises a judicial power, in cases of impeachment, and for trial
-79 This ultimate
of its own members, but as the court of dermer resort
appellate jurisdiction in an otherwise legislative body remains to this day m
England and much of the British Commonwealth.
The point of this argument was straightforward enough: m granting a new trial
on the 2d Thursday of May, 1795,"' the
m its "resolution or law
Connecticut legislature was exercising its appellate and not its legislative power.
Justice Iredell was quite unequivocal about this case being an exercise of judicial
power:

73.

Id. at 387

74.

Id.

75. Id. at 395 (Paterson, J., concumng). Justices Paterson and Iredell began their separate
opinions on this point. Id. at 395, 398. It is the only ground used by Justice Cushing in his
separate opinion. Id. at 400. Chief Justice Ellsworth and Justice Wilson did not take part in the
opinion.

76.
77.

Id. at 395 (Paterson, J., concurring).
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395 (1798) (Paterson, J., concurring).

78.

Id.

79.
80.

Id. at 398 (Iredell, J., concurring).
Id. at 386.
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The power [to superintend the courts of justice], however, is judicial in its nature,
and whenever it is exercised, as in the present instance, it is an exercise ofjudicial
not of legislative authority."'

As an exercise of judicial power, as Justice Cushing put it, "it is not touched by
the federal constitution." 8 Three of the four justices deciding Calder treated
this as at least coordinate with the constitutional argument; one of these three,
Justice Cushing, deemed it the only point worthy of consideration. Thirty years
later, in a detailed review of the case, Justice Johnson concluded from a careful
reading of the opinions that "all the judges who sat on the case of Calder vs. Bull,
concurred m the opinion" that the Connecticut legislature was exercising judicial,
not legislative power; 3 the entire ex post facto argument m the case was pure
dictum. s4
If Calder had not come up in the first decades of the Court, this ground would
have been dispositive. The Court would have avoided the ex postfacto clauses
on the standard wisdom that if there are dispositive grounds that do not require
constitutional interpretation, they are to be preferred. Why, then, did the justices
not take this course in 1798? Why did they feel constrained to address the
Calders' constitutional argument? Apparently because the Calders made the
argument and the Court was otherwise deciding against them.8 5 As Justice
Paterson wrote:
But as this view of the subject [ie, that the resolution was a judicial rather than a
legislative act] militates against the plaintiffs in error, their counsel has contended
for a reversal of the judgment, on the ground, that the awarding of a new trial was
the effect of a legislative act, and that it is unconstitutional, because an ex postfacto
law."

So, according to the lead opinion of Justice Chase, "[t]he sole inquiry" was
"whether this resolution or law of Connecticut
is an ex postfacto law, within
87
the prohibition of the federal constitution?

81. Id. at 398 (Iredell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 400 (Cushing, J., concurrng).
83. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416a n.a (1829).
84. Id. ("I then have the right to deny that the construction intimated by three of the judges,
m the case of Calder vs. Bull, is entitled to the weight of an adjudication. Nor is it immaterial, to

observe, that an adjudication upon a fundamental law, ought never to be irrevocably settled by a
decision that is not necessary and explicit.").
85. This too is a very Bntish view. The courts of Great Britain, right through to the House
of Lords, are constrained to resolve cases within the boundaries of the arguments made by counsel;

counsel can thus frame issues for decision even when other, established grounds are available. See
ALAN PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 45-49 (1982).
86.
87.

Calder 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 396 (Paterson, J., concurring).
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387 (1798).
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Justice Chase began the analysis in Calder, not with a definition of ex post
facto law, for that is exactly what was at stake, but with an explanation of why
the prohibition was made part of the Constitution:
The prohibition against their making ex postfacto laws was introduced for greater

caution, and very probably arose from the knowledge, that the parliament of Great
Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws, under the denomination
of bills of attainder, or bills of pains and penalties; the first inflicting capital, the
other less punishment. These acts were legislative judgments; and an exercise of
judicial power.'

Justice Chase then gave examples of ex post facto laws and mentioned their
justification only with derision: "To prevent such and similar acts of violence and
injustice, I believe, the federal and state legislatures were prohibited from passing
any bill of attainder, or any ex post facto law "89 From this start, he stated his
view as to "what law is to be considered an ex post facto law, within the words
and meaning of the Federal Constitution," the "meaning and intention"9° of the
ex post facto ban: "but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the
prohibition is this: that the legislatures of the several states, shall not pass laws,
after the fact done by a subject or citizen, which shall have relation to such fact,
and shall punish him for having done it."'" The ex post facto prohibition
supports the security of a person "from punishment by legislative acts, having a
retrospective operation. I do not think it was inserted, to secure the citizen in his
rights either of property or contracts. "
This, of course, is just a bald statement of position, not an argument. The
argument that ex postfacto applied to criminal laws only follows immediately and
is, in fact, the only argument found in this and the other opinions, and it is
repeated several times. 93 Justice Chase wrote:
The prohibitions not to make anything but gold and silver corn a tender m payment

of debts, and not to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, were
inserted to secure private rights; but the restriction not to pass any ex postfacto law
was to secure the person of the subject from injury or punishment, in consequence
of such law If the prohibition against making ex postfacto laws was intended to
secure personal rights from being affected or injured by such laws, and the
prohibition is sufficiently extensive for that object, the other restraints I have

88. Id. at 389. Justice Iredell made a somewhat similar use of history, saying that retroactive
laws are about crimes because m Europe, history shows how easily tyrants can abuse the power to
make retroactive laws and punishments. Id. at 398-400. As such, the argument rests on the drama
of examples. Does history not show abuse of abuse of retroactive civil laws? See id.
89. Id. at 389.
90. Id. at 390.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Because of the references to coinage, it is clear that the argument was addressed to Article
I, Section 10's prohibition on state ex postfacto legislation.
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enumerated, were unnecessary, and therefore, improper; for both of them are
retrospective."
Justice Chase repeated the argument a couple of pages later:
If the prohibition to make no ex postfacto law extends to all laws made after the
fact, the two prohibitions, not to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender
m payment of debts; and not to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts,
were improper and unnecessary "

Justice Paterson made the same argument:
Again, the words of the constitution of the United States are, "That no state shall
pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of
contracts." Article I., § 10. Where is the necessity or use of the latter words, if a
law impairing the obligation of contracts, be comprehended within the terms ex post
facto law?"
This is all there is m the four opinions of Calderthat one might call an argument.
It is hardly very persuasive. On the contrary, it is a patently weak argument,
surely not robust enough to support the expansive, unchecked retrospective
legislative power it licenses. The weakness lies in its completely ignonng the
prohibition on bills of attainder.
Bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties were ex postfacto criminal

laws, the former inflicting capital pumshment, the latter, lesser punishments. By
the time of the drafting of the constitution, the term "bills of attainder" was used
to include both.97 Justices Chase and Paterson's argument, in its own terms,
94. Calder 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
95. Id. at 393. The argument here is preceded by the following statement of policy, intimating
how tenuous the federal Supreme Court felt its power was at that time: "If the term ex post facto
law is to be construed to include and prohibit the enacting any law, after a fact, it will greatly
restrict the power of the federal and state legislatures; and the consequences of such a construction
may not be foreseen." Id.
96. Id. at 397. With express respect to Justice Paterson's form of the argument, near
contemporary Justice Johnson wrote:
But with all deference, I must contend, that if anything is to be deduced from the
arrangement of the three instances of restnction, the argument will be against him. For by
placing "expost facto laws" between bills of attainder, which are exclusively criminal, and
laws violating the obligation of contracts which are exclusively civil, it would rather seem
that ex postfacto laws partook of both characters, was common to both purposes.
Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416d n.a (1829). Expostfacto would thus fall under
the familiar interpretive maxim noscitur a sociis.
97 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867) ("A bill of attainder is a
legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. If the punishment be less than
death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills
of attainder include bills of pains and penalties.").
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works precisely as well to distinguish ex postfacto legislation from the criminal
bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties as it does to distinguish it from
laws impairing the obligation of contracts.98
Both Justices, rightly or wrongly, thought ex postfacto laws and bills of pains
and penalties were the same. 99 Justice Chase's identification of the two concepts
is explicit:
The prohibition against their making ex postfacto laws was introduced for greater
caution, and very probably arose from the knowledge, that the parliament of Great
Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws, under the denomination
of bills of attainder, or bills of pains and penalties; the first inflicting capital, the
other less punishment."t o

However it is possible, if implausible, that Justice Paterson meant "ex postfacto
law," as used in the constitution, to cover only what was previously covered by
"bills of pains and penalties." He wrote, "The words, ex postfacto, when applied
to a law, have a technical meaning, and, in legal phraseology, refer to crimes,
pains and penalties."10 1 If so, he and the constitutional drafters chose an
extremely deceptive way to express it, especially when there was a precise term
ready at hand. On this unlikely hypothesis, only Justice Chase demolishes his
own argument. More likely both justices, in their own terms, fall into the same

error.
In form, the argument goes like this: "A constitution or statute prohibits X, Y
and Z. If Y were the same as or within the scope of Z, then there would be a
redundancy, the same thing would be being prohibited twice. But we are entitled

98. Looking at the argument of Calder v. Bull "in its own terms" is essential. It makes sense
or not, is convincing or not, only according to the meanings of terms used to the authors (in so far
as it is possible for us to glean what that is). Different definitions of bills of attainder and bills of
pains and penalties have been promulgated. Bills of attainder were defined in Cummings v.
Missouri. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323. The Cummings definition has good
continuation with the argument that doing these things legislatively usurps a judicial function, and
with it the protections such as presumption of innocence, burden of proof, right to jury, right to
confront, etc. Many suggest that they include forfeiture of estates as well as the ascribed cnminal
penalty. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTrTONAL LAW § 6-26, at 482 (2d ed.
1988). Blackstone included corruption of the blood in his description of attainder: "By attainder
also, for treason or other felony, the blood of the person attainted is so corrupted as to be rendered
no longer heritable." 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *251. Later, however, Blackstone gives
corruption of blood and forfeiture as the meaning of "attaint" the consequences of attainder-and
says attainder follows from conviction for capital offenses. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at
**1036-40. It is purely prospective! It is separate from the conviction and punishment and so can
be separately reversed by act of parliament for any reason or none. Id. at *1040. If the Framers
followed Blackstone's confusion with corruption of the blood then there may also be a redundancy
in the prohibition in Article I, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 3.
99. Justice Johnson in his 1829 commentary points out that their secondary sources thought
so too. Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 416b n.a.
100. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798).
101. Id. at 396.
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to presume that the drafters intended to add something each time they used new
or different words. Thus, we are entitled to presume that X, Y, and Z have
different meanings." If this argument form is valid as used in Calder to show
that ex post facto laws cannot be about coinage or impairing the obligation of
contracts, then by parity it must also be an adequate demonstration that they
cannot be cnminal laws either. Retrospective criminal laws had already been
covered by the prohibition on bills of attainder.'0 2
To refute Justices Chase and Paterson s argument conclusively, one still must
show that there are some areas of behavior subject to potential retrospective
legislation, but not covered by bills of attainder or contracts. Examples are
scarcely difficult to come up with: Calder v Bull provides one; tax law, as m
United States v. Carlton,1°3 provides another.' °4 As Justice Paterson took
neither accord
pains to point out, "retrospective laws of every descnption
with sound legislation, nor the fundamental pnnciples of the social compact", and
"[t]here is neither policy or safety in such laws; and therefore, I have always had

a strong aversion against them."' 05 Surely the founding fathers, at the time of
drafting the constitution closely aware of the evils of tyranny, felt the same. Why

102. Quoting Blackstone, as does Justice Paterson, does not help where Blackstone was writing
against a clean slate, not about the meaning of a particular list in a written prohibition.
Judge Blackstone's description of the terms is clear and accurate. "There is, says he, a still
more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws, ex post facto, when,
after an action, indifferent in itself, is committed, the Legislator, then, for the first time,
declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punshment on the person who has committed
it. Here it is impossible, that the party could foresee, that an action, innocent when it was
done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he had, therefore, no
cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining, must, of consequence, be
cruel and unjust."
Id. (citations omitted). It is also interesting to note that precisely the opposite argument could be
made under the maxim noscitura sociis-indeedit was made by Governor Randolph m the Virgima
ratification debate. He argued that precisely because the ex postfacto prohibition came along with
the bill of attainder prohibition, that showed that the former must also be about criminal matters:
"The same clause provides that no bill of attainder shall be passed. It shows that the attention of
the Convention was drawn to cnimnal matters alone." 3 ELLIOT, supra note 44, at 477 The
argument so obviously fails to prove the ex post facto prohibition exclusively criminal as to look
disingenuous. In the adjacent Section 10, considered concurrently, the ex post facto provision was
adjacent to the obviously commercial interdiction of laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
Equally then, the Convention was focusing on civil matters alone.
103. 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).
104. Justice Johnson provides the following examples:
This Court has had more than once to toil up hill in order to bring within the restriction on
the states to pass laws violating the obligation of contracts, the most obvious cases to which
the constitution was intended to extend its protection: a difficulty, which it is obvious might
have been avoided by giving the phrase ex post facto its original and natural application.
Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 416c-d n.a.
105. Calder 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 397
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else would they have included such comprehensive lists in the prohibitions of
Article I, Sections 9 and 109 6
The same form of argument arises again when Justice Chase distinguishes the
ex post facto prohibition from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment:
The restraint against making any ex post facto laws was not considered by the
framers of the constitution, as extending to prohibit the depriving a citizen even of
the vested right to property; or the provision "that private property should not be
taken for public use, without just compensation," was unnecessary 07
Inescapably, the Fifth Amendment would cover ex post facto takings without
compensation, and the Due Process Clause has become the principal basis for
attacking retrospective legislation."' But, in the form used by Justice Chase,
the argument does no better than in its previous use to restrict ex postfacto laws
to the criminal. The Fifth Amendment was necessary for present and prospective
takings not otherwise constitutionally prohibited.i09
There is one further argument of this form undermining the restrictive
interpretation of ex post facto in Calder 10 It is hornbook law that to be
criminal an act must be done with criminal intent, mens rea. Can one act with
criminal intent when what one does is not a crime? An act innocent when
committed cannot be intentionally criminal, -and retroactive legislation cannot
change an actor's state of mind. Thus, in a real sense, if the ex post facto
prohibition of Article I, Sections 9 and 10 covers only criminal legislation, then
it is entirely redundant. But this redundnacy would not reach civil actions, in
which intent is not crucial.
What about reliance? Is not a citizen entitled to rely upon the present state of
the law and to shape her behavior accordingly without fear of the state? Calder
made such an argument:
106.

Professor Tribe argues the following:

Certainly the early expenence of England with bills of attainder and ex post facto laws had
demonstrated the willingness of Parliament to mandate the forfeiture of private estates as a
penalty for actions which were lawful when committed; and cases such as Cummings and
Galvan v. Press evidence the continued resourcefulness of legislative bodies in fashioning
civil disabilities which serve "punitive" goals. Thus, if the objective of insuring the
legislatures operate only prospectively when the nghts of individuals might be adversely
affected is to be served in any meaningful sense, the constitutional inhibition of ex postfacto
laws cannot be restricted to penal legislation.
supra note 98, § 10-2, at 637 n.30.
107 Calder 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 394 (citations omitted).
108. See discussion infra part III.
109. One is made well aware of the need for such an amendment when one reads Justice
Iredell's confident assertion that "private rights must yield to public exigencies" such as the building
of highways, "fortifications, light-houses, and other public edifices" on pnvate lands, with only a
passing nod to "allowing [the deprived owners] a reasonable equivalent." Calder 3 U.S. (3 Dali.)
at 400 (Iredell, J.,
concurring).
110. See Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights 11,6 TEX. L. REV 409, 419 (1928).
TRIBE,
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It is further urged, that if the provision does not extend to prohibit the making any
law, after a fact, then all choses in action; all lands by devise; by execution; by
judgments, particularly in torts; will be unprotected from the legislative power of
the states; rights vested may be divested at the will and pleasure of the state
legislatures; and therefore, that the true connection and meaning of the prohibition
is, that the states pass no law to deprive a citizen of any nght vested in him by
existing laws."'

The answer to this argument looks like faith alone: "[B]ut they won't do that!"

Justice Chase: "It is not to be presumed, that the federal or state legislatures will
pass laws to deprive citizens of rights vested in them by existing laws; unless for
'' i
the benefit of the whole community; and on making full satisfaction.
Carlton, at least, shows this faith is misplaced.
There is no other interpretive reasoning in the opinions of Calder There are,
however, various statements of sentiment, almost of policy For example, Justice

Cushing's brief opinion gives an alternative to the act being merely judicial. He
argued that the act in question "is maintained and justified by the ancient and
Justice Chase nervously
uniform practice of the state of Connecticut." '
deferred: "If the term ex postfacto law is to be construed to include and prohibit
the enacting any law, after a fact, it will greatly restrict the power of the federal
and state legislatures; and the consequences of such a construction may not be
foreseen. 114 One gets the feeling that the justices were wary of exercising their
power over a state supreme court and were looking for ways to avoid such a
confrontation.
Although many of the Framers of the Constitution, whose triumph of vision it
was, were still alive, Justice Chase paid scant respect to their intentions and the
meaning they gave to the words "ex postfacto." He did not stop at the dubious
conclusion that the prohibition of Sections 9 and 10 of Article I should reach only
criminal laws; he distinguished among criminal laws those few to which it should
be limited:
I do not consider any law ex post facto within the prohibition that mollifies the rigor
of the criminal law, but only those that create or aggravate the crime or increase the
punishment or change the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction.

There is a great and apparent difference between making an unlawful act lawful;
and the making an innocent action crmnal, and punishing it as a crime." 5
Where in the record of the federal convention or of the states' ratifying
conventions is the warrant for such further incursion into the obvious and natural
scope of the words "ex post facto?" It may be that we, along with Justice Chase,

111. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394 (1798).
112. Id.

113. Id. at 401 (Cushing, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 393.
115. Id. at 391.
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would prefer that it were so, but he seems to have read a restriction into the
Constitution's language by brute force.
Calder v. Bull then, is a very weak reed upon which to found a tradition of
constitutional interpretation. Arguably all its argument about the ex post facto
provision is dictum; in so far as itis not, only Justice Chase pursued the
restriction to criminal statutes with any enthusiasm, with two other justices merely
acquiescing. Interestingly, at the time, only two state constitutions, those of
Maryland and North Carolina, used ex postfacto in the restrictive sense. In 1830,
Justice Johnson wrote, "Maryland first used it in this restricted sense, and North
Carolina copied from Maryland; and if evidence of contemporaries may be relied
on, Mr. Chase was one of the committee who reported the constitution of
Maryland; and thus stands the authority for the restricted use."" 6 In a famous
and oft-cited opinion, New York's Chancellor Kent pointed out that Calder failed
to come to grips with the essential problem-although it holds that the
Constitution s prohibitions of ex post facto laws pertain only to criminal law[L]aws impairing previously acquired civil rights are equally within the reason of
that prohibition, and equally to be condemned.
[T]here is no distinction in
principle nor any recognized in practice, between a law punishing a person
criminally for a past innocent act, or punishing him civilly by divesting him of a
lawfully acquired right. The distinction exists only in the degree of oppression, and
history teaches us that the government which can deliberately violate the one right,
soon ceases to regard the other." 7
A mere thirty years after Calder, Justice Johnson concluded that "the case of
Calder vs. Bull cannot claim the pre-eminence of an adjudged case upon this
point, and if adjudged was certainly not sustained by reason or authorities."'' 8
2.

Fletcher v Peck

The reasoning of Calder v. Bull came up for Supreme Court review a mere
twelve years later in Fletcher v. Peck."9 Peck sold certain land to Fletcher,
"lands which were part of a large purchase made by James Gunn, in the year
1795, from the state of Georgia, the contract for which was made in the form of
a bill passed by the legislature of the state."' ° Fletcher, the purchaser, sued
Peck for breach of covenants in the deed of sale.'2' Apparently Gunn had
bribed the Georgia legislature with gifts of the land it was about to sell him.
So bad was the transaction that a later legislature rescinded the initial granting

116. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416d n.a (1829).
117
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Dash v. VanKleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 5 Am. Dec. 291, 310-11 (N.Y 1811).
Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 416e n.a.
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 132.
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legislation.'
But in the meantime, there had been intermediate transferees
between Gunn and Peck, so Peck could plausibly maintain that he had taken the
land as an innocent bona fide purchaser. 24 According to Chief Justice
25
Marshall, in such circumstances the burden on the state must be great.
Marshall stated that "[t]he legislature of Georgia was a party to this transaction;
and for a party to pronounce its own deed invalid, whatever cause may be
assigned for its invalidity, must find its vindication in a train of reasoning not
often heard in courts of justice.' 12
1
Chief Justice Marshall began, as did Justice Chase m Calder,27 with a
discussion of natural law arguments, but did not rest the decision invalidating the
retrospective legislation on these arguments."28 Georgia, as one of the Umted
States, is subject to the positive limitations on its power found m the Federal
Constitution, one limitation being that "the constitution of the United States
declares that no state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts."' 29

Since the original grant of land to

Gunn was by contract, a "law annulling" that conveyance "would be as repugnant
to the constitution as a law discharging the vendors of property from the
obligation of executing their contracts by conveyances."' 0 But the Chief
Justice did not let the decision rest on the prohibition against laws impairing the
obligation of contracts. He continued with a discussion of ex postfacto laws that
ran directly counter to the opinions in CalderAn ex postfacto law is one which renders an act punishable in a manner in which

it was not punishable when committed. Such a law may inflict penalties on the
person, or may inflict pecumary penalties which swell the public treasury The
legislature is then prohibited from passing a law by which a man s estate or any
part of it, shall be seized for a crime which was not declared by some previous law,
to render him liable to that punishment. Why, then, should violence be done to the
natural meaning of words for the purpose of leaving to the legislature the power of
seizing, for public use, the estate of an individual in the form of a law annulling the
title by which he holds that estate? The court can perceive no sufficient grounds

for making this distinction. This rescinding act would have the effect of an ex post

123. Id. at 128-30.
124. Id. at 131-32.
125. id. at 132.
126.

Id.

127. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-88 (1798).
128. Fletcher 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 133-35. Justice Johnson, m a dissenting opinion, would
have relied on natural law grounds. Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("I do not hesitate to declare
that a state does not possess the power of revoking its own grants. But I do it, on a general
principle, on the reason and nature of things; a principle which will impose laws even on the

Deity.').
129.

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).

130. Id. at 137
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facto law.

It forfeits the estate of Fletcher for a crime not comntted by

himself. 3 '

Whether this statement is dictum is as difficult to determine as whether the ex
post facto line of reasoning in Calder is dictum. Neither statement is essential
to the decision, but both seem to have been the principal focus of their author's
attention. But, whether essential or not, Chief Justice Marshall's argument here
is significantly contrary to Justice Chase's argument in Calder If the state cannot
take a person's property for hitherto innocent conduct, now seen as criminal,
should the state be permitted to take the property of a person who is presently
innocent and was innocent at the time the retrospective bill took effect?
As of 1810, then, the scope of the ex post facto prohibition could not
conclusively be assumed to be limited to criminal laws only No adequate
argument for such a restriction had yet been made, and Chief Justice Marshall had
offered powerful reasons against it. Justice Johnson took every available
For example, m 1827 he wrote:
opportunity to argue against the limitation.'
By classing bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation
of contracts together, the general intent becomes very apparent; it is a general
provision against arbitrary and tyrannical legislation over existing rights, whether
of person or property. It is true, that some confusion has arisen from the opinion,
which seems early, and without due examination, to have found its way into the
Court; that the phrase "ex postfacto," was confined to laws affecting criminal acts
alone. The fact, upon examination, will be found otherwise; for neither in its
signification or uses is it thus restricted. It applies to civil as well as to criminal
acts

133

As Justice Johnson predicted, the limitation to criminal legislation only would
become a source of difficulty and strained reasoning.34
C. Other Cases
Nevertheless, in 1854, when the Supreme Court upheld a retrospective change
in estate tax law, it relied entirely on Calder v. Bull and its own view of the
original intent of the framers.' 35 The Court stated that "[t]he debates in the
federal convention upon the constitution show that the terms ex postfacto laws

131. Id. at 138.
132. He even created an otherwise unavailable opportunity by writing an
appended to the 1829 report when the case prompting it was not suitable.
Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416 n.a (1829) (Johnson, J., concurring).
133. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 212, 286 (1827).
134. He wrote that the limitation is "[an] unhappy idea, that the phrase 'ex
Constitution of the United States, was confined to criminal cases exclusively;
leaves a large class of arbitrary legislative acts without the prohibitions of
Satterlee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 416 (Johnson, J., concurring).
135. Carpenter v Pennsylvania, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456, 463 (1854).

extensive critique
See Satterlee v.

post facto, in the
a decision which
the constitution."
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were understood in a restricted sense, relating to cnminal cases only, and that the
description of Blackstone of such laws was referred to for their meaning." 3
The Court thus revived and reinforced Justice Chase's restrictive interpretation
without further argument, relying on cites to Calder, and, astoundingly, Fletcher
v. Peck.137 The statute in question explained, and so extended, the meaning of
tax statute to property that would
a term in a prior statute, thus applying an estate
38
previously not have been within its scope.'
After the Civil War, the Court ran into the difficulties Johnson had forecast.
Lacking a constitutional inhibition, the Court had to strain reason and, perhaps
credulity, in order to prevent clear retributive injustice. The difficulty arose with
"test oaths" in order to be permitted to hold "any office of honor [or] trust" like
teacher, lawyer, church officer, or priest, a person had to take an oath to the effect
that he had never acted or spoken against the United States, or even sympathized
with anyone who did, or moved out of state to dodge a draft or a host of other
139
things, many of which were not then and still are not in themselves crimes.
The government argued that these were merely licensing requirements, well
within its powers, and in no way either criminal or retrospective. Justice Miller,
writing for a four-person dissent in both Cummings v. Missouri"4 and Ex Parte
4
1 stated: "As far as I am informed, this is the first time in the history
Garland,1
of jurisprudence that taking an oath of office has been called a criminal
proceeding." " If the proceeding was not criminal, the argument goes, then it
was not within the scope of the ex post facto prohibition, and, therefore,
permissible. But the choice facing any supporter of the South in the recent war
was perjury or unemployment.
Had the majority in Cummings or Garlanda general ex postfacto prohibition
in its constitutional repertoire, the task would have been considerably easier: it
would have had to show only that the effect of the "test oath" retirements was
retroactively to change the legal status of past actions. But, with Calder's
restrictive interpretation firmly in place, the majority faced the additional hurdle
of showing that an apparently civil professional licensing requirement was in fact
penal. We may sympathize with the majority's motives and objective, but its

136. Id. (citations omitted),
137 Id.
138.

Id. Notice, in passing, that there was no action that Carpenter, the executor of the will of

William Short, or the late William Short himself while alive, could have taken in reliance on the
pnor state of the law other than to move out of the jurisdiction. Thus, the prima facie appeal of
Carpenter as precedent for Carlton is illusory.
139. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 316-18 (1866) (discussing the test oath
provisions in the new Missouri constitution). See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 334-36
(1867) (discussing a federal statute governing licensing to practice law in federal courts). The cases
came up together, and the majority opinions were both by Justice Field. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
at 374-81; Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 316-32. There is a unified dissent by Justice Miller
following Ex Parte Garland. Garland,71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 381-99 (Miller, J., dissenting).
140. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).

141. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
142. Id.at 392.
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reasoning is still strained. "[These] disabilities
must be regarded as
penalties-they constitute punishment.
Disqualification from office may be
[a] punishment.' 43 The majority refused to limit the meaning of "punishment"
to deprivation of life, liberty, or property " Punishment is the function of
criminal law, so these "licensing laws" are really criminal in function, even if not
in appellation.
The point is a clear one: virtually any criminal law could be rephrased as civil.
For example, the first federal statute exercising control over the use of and trade
in marijuana was simply a tax statute, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 '45 That
Act required:
[Anyone] importing, producing, selling or m any other way dealing with the drug
to pay an occupational tax and to register with the Internal Revenue Service and

all transferees of marijuana are required to file a written order form and to pay a
transfer tax, $1 per ounce if registered and a prohibitive $100 per ounce if not
registered. "4

If the simple "Rumpelstiltskin" device of "naming and claiming" can take a
statute out of the scope of a constitutional prohibition, then the constitution is a
weak safeguard indeed. As Justice Field wrote in Cummings:
The Constitution deals with
[It] is one of form only, and not of substance.
substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was levelled at the thing, not the name
If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, its insertion in the
fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding.'47

Yet one could equally say that most civil statutes could equally be rephrased as
criminal, and that this, more than anything, is what the 1867 Supreme Court
majority did.
More generally, however, the point of this argument is that the distinction
drawn so carefully between civil and criminal laws in Calder and its progeny is
essentially vacuous. A legislature determined to make retroactive criminal
prohibitions can formulate a civil statute to the same effect; the federal licensing
statute in Ex Parte Garlandis an example.1 48 Conversely, a determined court

143.
144.

Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320.
Id.

145. See Richard J. Bonnie & Charles H. Whitebread, II, The ForbiddenFruit and the Tree of
Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History ofAmerzcan MarijuanaProhibition,56 VA. L. REV.

971, 1048 (1970) ("The first assertion of federal authority over marijuana use was the Marihuana
Tax Act, passed m 1937.").
146. Id. at 1061.
147 Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 325.
148. See Garland,71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 334-36. For more recent examples, see De Veau v.
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 145 (1960) (discussing provisions of the New York Waterfront Commission
Act of 1953); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) (discussing the validity of the retroactivity
of Pennsylvania's Habitual Criminal Act of 1939); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 630-31
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can take a retroactive civil statute and rephrase it as criminal in order to bring it
under the Constitution's prohibitions; arguably Justice Field's opinions in
Cummings and Garlandare examples. If, as one writer put it:
Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, twin sisters of legislative oppression,
directed for the most part at political offenders, were so vivid in the political
background of the framers of the constitution and so obnoxious to their ideals of
justice as to call for an express constitutional prohibition.'49

then, as interpreted, the ex post facto ban m Article I, Sections 9 and 10, is
peculiarly ineffective. Professor Tribe makes this very point:
Certainly the early experience of England with bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws had demonstrated the willingness of Parliament to mandate the forfeiture of
private estates as a penalty for actions which were lawful when committed; and
cases such as Cummings and Galvan v. Press evidence the continued
resourcefulness of legislative bodies in fashioning civil disabilities which serve
"punitive" goals. Thus, if the objective of insuring the legislature's operate only
prospectively when the rights of individuals might be adversely affected is to be
prohibition of ex post facto laws
served in any meaningful sense, the constitutional
50
cannot be restricted to penal legislation.

Showing a civil law to be cnminal in function and thus subject to the ex post
facto prohibition was one strategy; another was to shoe-horn retroactive state civil
legislation into the contract mold, thus subjecting it to the prohibition against state
"law impairng the obligation of contracts. ' 5 In 1861, California enacted a
statute licensing pilots in San Francisco."' The statute included a provision
stating that if a pilot offered his services and was refused, he was still "entitled
to one-half pilotage fees." '53 On November 1, 1861, pilot Joliffe offered
services to the steamship Golden Gate." 4 He was refused and sued for one half
the fee. 55 Since that time, a new 1864 statute repealed the 1861 statute, but

(1912) (upholding a West Virgima statute which allowed for additional prison time for past
offenses); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312-13 (1901) (upholding a Massachusetts
statute requinng a 25-year pnson sentence for habitual criminals); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S.
189, 200 (1898) (finding a New York statute that made it criminal for an ex-felon to practice
medicine did not conflict with Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution). But see Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246-47 (1957) (concluding that New Mexico's statute
requiring candidates for the state bar have good moral character may only be satisfied by current
behavior, not past bad acts).
149 Smith, supra note 110, at 412.
150. TRIBE, supra note 98, § 10-2, at 637 n.30.
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
152. See Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 450, 455 (1864).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 455-56.
155. Id. at 456. This is not so unreasonable as it may now seem: pilotage was valuable for the
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was in all relevant respects similar. 5 6 There could not have been a contract,
because the services were refused, so the repeal of the statute did not, primafacie,
impair the obligation of contracts. 157 But, according to Justice Field, it was a
quasi contract, a contractual remedy provided by law and he gave normal quasi
contract illustrations.158 'So, the statute of 1864 repealing the prior law could
not affect rights in place under the old law and the pilot prevailed. 9 In
dissent, Justice Miller argued that "a right of action not growing out of contract,
but which is solely dependent upon a statute, ceases and determines with the
statute on which it depends."'" Had the Supreme Court not been constrained
by the narrow reading imposed on the Constitution's ex post facto prohibitions,
it would not have needed such contortions to reach the just and equitable
result."'
Despite these difficulties, the restriction of Calder had become ingrained in our
jurisprudence by the end of the Civil War and has remained in place to this
day
In 1990, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, accurately*
Although the Latin phrase "ex post facto" literally encompasses any law passed
"after the fact," it has long been recognized by this Court that the Constitutional
prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage
the offender affected by them.
[T]he Court has consistently adhered to the view expressed by Justices Chase,
Paterson and Iredell in Calder 163

safety of many vessels, and a pilot had to go to considerable expense and sometimes danger to meet
ships off-shore and bnng them in. That expense would be incurred whether or not the services
were accepted.
156. Id. at 458.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 455-63.
159. Id. at 458.
160. Id. at 464 (Miller, J., dissenting).
161.

See, e.g., New Jersey v. Wilson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, 166-67 (1812). Cf Maynard v

Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 214 (1888) (finding that a marriage is not a private contract and, thus, an
Oregon statute forbidding the passage of laws that impaired a pnvate contract did not provide a
divorced wife with an interest in land her ex-husband had settled upon prior to the divorce).
Presumably New Jerseyv. Wilson was one of the cases to which Justice Johnson was refemng when
he wrote:
This Court has had more than once to toil up hill in order to bring within the restriction on
the states to pass laws violating the obligation of contracts, the most obvious cases to which
the constitution was intended to extend its protection; a difficulty, which it is obvious, might
have been avoided, by giving the phrase ex post facto its original and natural application.
Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416c-d n.a (1829).
162. See, e.g., Gut v. State, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 35, 37-38 (1869).
163. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 & n.2 (1990) (citing Calder v Bull, 1 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 390-92 (1798)). Despite the professed reverence for Calderv. Bull, the Court in Collins
v. Youngblood narrowed the interpretation of the scope of the ex postfacto prohibition from the one

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 27

Yet retroactive legislation is no less harsh and oppressive, no less contrary to
our intuitions of justice and the history of jurisprudence because it is merely civil
and not criminal. Nor does the restrictive interpretation of the phrase "ex post
facto law" change the evident intent of the Framers. "By classing bills of
attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts
together, the general intent becomes very apparent; it is a general provision
against arbitrary and tyrannical legislation over existing rights, whether of person
or property "" The judicial system has had to develop alternative techniques
for policing obnoxious retroactive civil legislation. This policing began with
natural law arguments, and developed into due process rationales under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Arguably this approach has been better, allowing
greater judicial sensitivity to legislative exigencies, as well as to variations in
oppressive impact. We turn in the next section to these alternate approaches.
II. ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS FOR POLICING RETROACTIVE CIVIL LEGISLATION

There is a long tradition of hostility to retroactive legislation among the most
65
prominent of jurisprudential thinkers. As early as 353 B.C. in Athens,
Demosthenes called such a statute "the most disgraceful and scandalous ever
enacted in your assembly, ' 166 even6 though the statute in question benefited, not
penalized, its particular subjects. 1
The roots of this hostility were made patently clear by the thirteenth-century
Aristotelian theologian, St. Thomas Aquinas:
Wherefore, m order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it
must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is
made by its being notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is

necessary for the law to obtain its force."c

Here, St. Thomas makes the fundamental argument against retroactive legislation:
A person ought not to be bound by a law of which he could not have notice, and
no written law can be promulgated retrospectively

originating in Justice Chase's opinion as it has come down to us through the hitherto settled
interpretation of Thompson v. Utah and Kring v. Missouri. See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343
(1898); Knng v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883).
164. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 286 (1827).
165. Translator's Introduction to Demosthenes' Speech Against Timocrates (353 B.C.), in
DEMOSTHENES AGAINST MEIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGETON 37071 (J.H. Vince trans., T.E. Page et al. eds., 1935).
166. Demosthenes' Speech Against Timocrates (353 B.C.), in DEMOSTHENES AGAINST MEIDIAS,
ANDROTION, AR!STOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON 383 (J.H. Vince trans., T.E. Page et al.
eds., 1935).
167. Id. at 373. See 2 SIR PAUL VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 139-

40 (1922); Smead, supra note 36, at 775.
168.

THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA" OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Q. 90, Art. 4, at 7-8 (1273).
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Four centuries later, 69 foundational social contract theorist John Locke
explained, "The Legislative, or Supream Authority, cannot assume to its self a
power to Rule by extemporary Arbitrary Decrees, but is bound to dispense
Justice, and decide the Rights of the Subject by promulgatedstandingLaws, and
7
Locke s reasoning, typical for his time,' 7' was
known Authoris d Judges.1iO
to take a hypothetical state of nature ruled by natural law and show how society
is derived to alleviate the miseries of natural law 172 Society requires the
denizens of the state of nature to invest all their natural law authority in the new
commonwealth. Locke writes, "[T]he community put[s] the Legislative Power
into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be govern'd by
declared Laws, or else their Peace, Quiet, and Property will still be at the same
uncertainty, as it was in the state of Nature.' 1 73 Retroactive legislation does not
come within Locke's definition of "declared laws" because no legislature can
declare a law made now to have stood m the past. Thus, a legislature that enacts
retroactive laws creates the uncertainty and insecurity characteristic of the state
of nature.
Within the arguments against retroactive legislation, one can detect two strands
of thought, both involving notice and reliance. First, there is an analytic
argument, looking at the concept of law and its function in society If law is to
guide and delimit behavior, if government is to be able to use legislation as a
means of societal ordering and control, then legislation has to be available to

169. In between, others such as Sir Francis Bacon, also wrote of the logical and ethical
abhorrence of retroactive laws. See, e.g., FRANCIs BACON, 8 OF THE DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT
OF LEARNING, in 5 WORKS 97 (aphorisms 47-49) (James Spedding et al. eds., 1864).
170. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 136, at 404 (Peter Laslett ed., rev. ed.
1965) (3d ed. 1698). The drafting of the U.S. Constitution was heavily influenced by the political
writings of John Locke. Philosopher C.D. Broad wrote that Locke's principles "were embalmed
in the Constitution of the United States which survives like an ancient family ghost haunting a
modem sky-scraper." C.D. Broad, John Locke, 31 HIBERT J. 249, 256 (1933). Of course, we do
not regard our constitution as a ghostly relic. But perhaps in Carlton the Supreme Court treats it
more as such than as a living, constitutive law.
171. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN chs. XIII-XVI (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1974)
(1668). But the method is not entirely displaced by less naturalistic thought experiments such as
Rawl's "veil of ignorance." See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971). Robert
Nozick uses a state of nature story, calling it a "hypothetical explanation," which, if true, would
explain the social organization phenomena we presently prefer. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 7-9 (1974).
172. LOCKE, supra note 170, § 136, at 404-05. In the state of nature, the law of nature or
unwritten law is found only in the minds of men, thus those who nusapply it will not easily be
convinced of their mistake absent an established judge. But under the law of nature, each man is
judge, interpreter, and executioner of the law; and, the individual, having only single strength, does
not have enough strength to defend himself or to punish those who misapply the law. Thus, Locke
points out that in order to avoid the inconveniences that disorder men's properties in the state of
nature, men form societies to achieve security and defense of their properties through the united
by which every one
strength of the whole society, as well as through binding, "standingRules
may know what is his." Id. § 136, at 404.
173. Id. § 136, at 404-05.
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those whose behavior is subject to that limitation, ordenng, and control. If a law
has yet to be enacted, limiting or adjusting one's behavior according to the law
is a temporal impossibility " The second strand is normative: it is morally
abhorrent to demand a person to behave according to a rule that could not be
known, or to take away the benefits of reliance on law that is positively and
publicly in place. Retroactive legislation is the paradigm abuse of this precept,
ranking with secret legislation, or the arbitrary whim and fancy of a tyrannical
despot in abuse of governmental power, or of government by men, not law
Both strands of thought are brought out by the great twentieth century
junsprude Lon L. Fuller.i15 To illustrate, Fuller described eight ways in which
legislatures fail to make law 176 Three of the ways include:
(2) [F]ail[ing]

to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected

to observe; (3)
abus[ing] retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself
guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective m effect, since it puts
them under the threat of retrospective change
(7) introducing such frequent
17
changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them
Fuller argued that failing in any one of these ways would result not only m a
morally bad system of law, but also in something that could not properly be
called a legal system.i T7 "Certainly there can be no rational ground for
asserting that a man can have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not
exist, or is kept secret from him, or that came into existence only after he had
acted
or [that] changed every minute."' 79

174. As the Supreme Court recently recognized: "To spell out intent in 1941 to evade a
statutory requirement not enacted until 1967 attributes, at the very least, a remarkable prescience
to the employer." United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977). The same thinking
is behind the requirements of some states that statutes be in a particular language, and that foreign
words cannot control English speaking subjects. See, e.g., In re Lockett, 178 P 134, 138 (Cal.
1919) (finding a state statute prohibiting fellation unconstitutional because "fellatio" is not an
English word).
175. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (rev. ed. 1964). Fuller was not
sympathetic with the positivism that came out of England. But on the point in question here,
foundational utilitarian Jeremy Bentham and Fuller are in complete agreement.
That a law may be obeyed, it is necessary that it should be known; that it may be known,
it is necessary that it be promulgated.
To promulgate a law, is to present it to the minds
of those who are to be governed by it in such a manner as that they may have it habitually
in their memories, and may possess every facility for consulting it if they have any doubts
respecting what it prescribes.
It is true that before laws can be promulgated, they must
exist.
1 JEREMY
176.

BENTHAM, WoRKs 157
FULLER, supra note 175,

177

Id. at 38-39.

178. Id.
179.

Id.

(John Bowrng ed., 1843).
at 39.
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The founding fathers were well aware of these arguments. At the very
introduction of the language of Article I, Section 9 to the constitutional
convention,180 two of the more prominent jurisprudential thinkers present thought
the impossibility and immorality of retroactive legislation too palpable to require
an express prohibition. The record states:
Mr. Ellsworth contended that there was no lawyer, no civilian, who would not say,
that ex post facto laws were void of themselves. It cannot, then, be necessary to
prohibit them.
Mr. Wilson was against inserting anything in the constitution, as to ex post facto
laws. It will bring reflection on the constitution and proclaim that we are ignorant
of the first principles of legislation, or our constitutional government that will be
SO.181

In the first Supreme Court case to visit the subject, Calder v. Bull,"' both the
logical and the normative underpinnings of ex post facto laws came up for
discussion. Justice Chase preceded his actual argument with two fascinating
paragraphs on natural jurisprudence. He began with the analytic argument that
"[t]he nature and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This
fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our free republican
governments, that no man should be compelled to do what the laws do not
require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws permtisi and continued on
what "our free republican governments" cannot do."s Justice Iredell, in his
opinion, took time vigorously to oppose retroactive laws on moral grounds. "If
the legislature of the Union, or the legislature of any member of the Union,
shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the court
cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary
to the principles of natural justice."'8 5 We see here the struggle of a new
Supreme Court in a new nation with a new constitution to settle the underpinnings
of the whole interpretive judicial endeavor. Our great fourth Chief Justice, John
Marshall, continued the theme in Fletcher v. Peck.86 There exist, he wrote,
"certain great principles of justice, whose authonty is universally acknowledged,
that ought not to be entirely disregarded.' 8 7 Although this sort of thinking was
not the basis of the decision, it is foundational to the argument. If the state could
avoid the first conveyance because it was infected with fraud, "[a]ll titles would
be insecure, and the intercourse between man and man would be seriously

180. On Wednesday, August 22, 1787. MADISON JOURNAL, supra note 16, at 586.
181. Id. See 1 BENTON, supra note 15, at 985-86; 2 FARRAND, supra note 15, at 375-76; 3
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 14, at 1399-1400.

182. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
183. Id. at 388.
184. Id. But this thought played no further part in Justice Chase's argument in the case itself.
185. Id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring).
186.

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).

187. Id. at 133.
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obstructed, if this principle be overturned."' 88 And, to Fletcher's argument that
a legislature is competent to repeal an act of a previous legislature, Marshall
responded:
But, if an act be done under a law, a succeeding legislature cannot undo it. The
past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power.
It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does not
prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and, if any be prescribed, where are
they to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may
be seized without compensation."

Justice Johnson based his concurrence solely on such principles, "on the reason
and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even on the Deity
The security of a people against the misconduct of their rulers, must lie in the
frequent recourse to first principles, and the imposition of adequate constitutional
restrictions." 190 Principled antipathy to retroactive laws of all kinds is abundant
in the writing of these men, the foundational thinkers of our society But it was
not long before analytic complexity came to be written onto this relatively clear
and uncluttered jurisprudential slate.
A newly enacted statute can be retroactive in two ways. First, it can by its
terms come into effect at a date earlier than its enactment. Second, it can have
effects on legal rights and relations established under prior law 191 Credit for
first enunciating this distinction is usually given to Justice Story in the New
Hampshire case, Society for the Propagationof the Gospel in Foreign Parts v.
Wheeler 192 At issue in Wheeler was the application of New Hampshire's
constitution, in particular the "23rd article of the bill of rights, which declares that
'retroactive laws are highly injurious, oppressive and unjust. No such laws,
therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes or the
punishment of offenses."" '93 Justice Story asked, "What is a retroactive law
within the true intent of this article? Is it confined to statutes, which are enacted
to take effect from a time anterior to their passage? or does it embrace all statutes,
which, though operating only from their passage, affect vested rights and past

188. Id. at
189.

133-34.

Id. at 135.

190. Id. at 143-44 (Johnson, J., concurring).
191. The distinction is drawn in many articles. See, e.g., Gregory J. DeMars, Retrospectivity
and Retroactivity of Civil Legislation Reconsidered, 10 OHIO N.U. L. REv 253, 254-57 (1983)
(arguing that "retroactive" should be stipulatively confined to the first sense, and "retrospective"

to the second, a wish for a definitional distinction that none of us has the power to fulfill); Stephen
R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STuD. 373, 375-80 (1977) (calling the two the "strong"
and the "weak" senses of "retrospective"); W David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative
Considerationsin Retroactive Lawmalang, 48 CAL. L. REv 216, 216-19 (1960); Smead, supranote

36, at 782; Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L. REv 231, 232 (1927).
192. 22 F Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156). However, like so many subsequent
insights, it was anticipated by Francis Bacon. See BACON, supra note 169, at 97-98.

193.

Wheeler 22 F Cas. at 767.
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transactions?"' 9 4 He argued that a retroactive law could not be limited to the
former, because that would be "utterly subversive of all the objects of the
provision" and "would enable the legislature to accomplish that indirectly, which
it could not do directly "i95
What exactly does he mean? Justice Story's rather cryptic pronouncement
needs spelling out, at least to overcome the obvious point: very many, if not all,
statutes are retroactive in the second sense. 196 Many laws prospective in
operation change legal rights and relations that have been established under prior
laws. Take for example a simple zoning ordinance: it will inevitably change
property values in some way, disturbing the expectations of persons who had
acted in reliance on the preceding zomng or lack of it. If such laws were
considered retroactive for the purpose of New Hampshire's constitutional
prohibition, then the New Hampshire legislature would be severely limited in its
ability to legislate. Retroactivity in this second sense, then, is to be distinguished
from that in which, by ante-dating the effectiveness of a statute, the legislature
seeks to change the legal character of an action already completed under prior
law 197
There are two arguments that need to be addressed. First, Justice Story was
concerned to establish that, although the first type of retroactive law, effective
from a time "anterior to [its] passage," is obviously suspect, the second type, ,
prima facie prospective but disturbing previously vested rights, could be equally
costly For example: suppose an investor were to buy seaside property for future
development which, at the time of purchase, was within the local land-use
planning laws. Subsequently, a change in law directed to conservation prohibits
all future development of seaside property Would not that investor have lost
substantially by relying on the state of the law at the time of his purchase 9
Clearly, the second type of retroactivity can be at least as costly as the first. 9 '
Conversely, a statute retroactive in the first sense, by its express terms applying
to conduct prior to its enactment, could impose no reliance costs. Curative
legislation, making the law in fact what everyone had, erroneously, thought it to

194. Id.
195. Id. Justice Story cited with approval the opinion of Chancellor Kent m Dash v.
VanKleeck, a great opinion but one which neither draws this distinction nor makes this argument.
Id. (citing Dash v. VanKleeck, 7 Johns. 477 5 Am. Dec. 291, 306-13 (N.Y 1811)).
196. See Slawson, supra note 191, at 216-19; Smead, supra note 36, at 782; Smith, supra note
191, at 232.
197. At least one commentator, Munzer, argues that it is only in this stronger sense that
retroactive legislation is problematic. Munzer, supra note 191, at 385-90.
198. See Slawson, supra note 191, at 219-20. Similar retroactivity can result from judicial
interpretation of statutes. Slawson gives a useful example: In a surprise decision, Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co., the Supreme Court held that under the F.L.S.A., the time spent donning work
clothes and walking to the work site was part of the work week. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co., 328 U.S. 680, 691-92 (1946). As a consequence, many groups of workers sued for overtime
for that time since the effectiveness of the statute. Slawson, supra note 191, at 228. Courts
uniformly denied such relief and the Supreme Court uniformly denied certiorari. See, e.g., Battaglia
v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).
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be is such.'" Thus, the wrongfulness of retroactivity is not confined to whether
it applies expressly to events antenor to its enactment or has effects on behavior
planned under prior law
Justice Story's second point was that prohibiting only the first type of
retroactivity "would enable the legislature to accomplish that indirectly, which it
could not do directly -2o Presumably, he had in mind examples like this:
under the New Hampshire constitution the legislature could hardly place a tax on
inheritances completed in the three years preceding enactment. But, if it were
permissible to disturb settled rights, it might enact a levy on all property now
owned that was obtained by way of inheritance during those same years. That
assessment would be purely prospective on its face, but it would achieve precisely
the same end as inpermissible retroactive estate tax. If only retroactivity in the
first sense were prohibited, the legislature would have achieved indirectly what
it could not directly The result would be every bit as abhorrent as a directly
retroactive equivalent. "But if, in the absence of statute, he does something not
then taxed and afterwards, when he cannot withdraw, Congress retroactively
levies an assessment on this completed act, then he may properly feel that he has
been unfairly treated." 20' Yet, the method should work for any statute that
Justice Story's
would be prohibited as retroactive in the first sense. 2
arguments appear to compel the conclusion that both senses of retroactivity are
relevant, at least to New Hampshire's constitutional prohibition.0 3
Yet, almost all legislation disturbs some legal nghts settled under prior law
This leaves us with a dilemma: if retroactive legislation is, primafacie, unjust,
then almost all legislation is also, prima facie, equally unjust. Justice Story
himself must have faced this dilemma: He was generally hostile to retroactivity,
but he was surely not equally hostile to legislation itself."X One solution is to
decide that, ancient and modem jurisprudential wisdom to the contrary
notwithstanding, retroactivity itself is not only not objectionable, it is of no

199. For further discussion of curative legislation as an exception to the general antipathy to
retroactive legislation, see infra notes 224-239 and accompanying text.
200. Wheeler 22 F Cas. at 767
201. Julius H. Amberg, Retroactive Excise Taxation, 37 HARV. L. REV 691, 692 (1924).
202. Because of the overlap of jurisdictions, just such a result occurred in Louisville and
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Motley. See Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 468
(1911). In 1871, Mr. and Mrs. Mottley settled a damages action for free passes on the railway,
renewable annually for their lives. Id. at 471. But in 1906 the railway refused to renew, citing a
new federal statutory prohibition: The Commerce Act of June 29, 1906, m section 1prohibited free
tickets, and in section 6 mandated uniform rates, banning not only greater or less but also "or
different" charges. Id. at 472-74. As the statute did not make "any exceptions of existing
contracts," the railway prevailed. Id. at 479. Of course, had it been a state statute, Article I,
Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution which prohibits interference with the obligation of contracts,
would have prevented this result. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
203. Contra Munzer, supra note 191, at 385-90.
204. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, CONSTTUTION § 1398 (5th ed. 1891) ("Retrospective laws are,
indeed, generally injust; and, as has been forcibly said, neither accord with sound legislation nor
with fundamental principles of the social compact.").
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juridical consequence. Some commentators have reached this conclusion,"0 5
and, unhappily, so has the present Supreme Court.2" On this view, a statute
retroactive in either sense must pass constitutional muster on the same, and no
more than the same, criteria as any statute with no retroactive effects at all.20 7
We do not have to give up so easily After all, it is unlikely that the intuitive
abhorrence we all commonly feel, and the general hostility of so many major
figures m the history of jurisprudence toward retroactive legislation should be
completely unfounded. In light of Justice Story's second argument-that what
can be achieved by the first kind of retroactivity can equally be achieved by the
second 204-we should not expect to find differences of sufficient legal
sigmficance to enable us to draw a pnncipled distinction between the two kinds
of retroactivity To be sure, ante-dating the effectiveness of a statute to before
its enactment seems worse. But this probably reflects only the perception that
such legislation is always unjust:2° our intuitive judgment is automatically
negative, and, unless the new law is curative 10 or unusually trivial, it is certain
that somebody will be unfairly hurt. On the other hand, our judgment of prima
facie prospective laws which disturb antecedently settled rights cannot be so
automatic. As most prospective laws affect some rights and obligations settled
under prior law, this would entail the absurdity of automatically judging all
statutes negatively What we should be looking for are cnteria for determining,
among both kinds of retroactivity, which is to be condemned, which is immoral,
which if pursued would be destructive of democratic government.
One popular approach has been to base the distinction on whether the
disturbance caused by the legislation is to a right that is vested or not vested. A
hint of this idea can be found in the language used by Justice Story in Wheeler
when he asked, does the state "affect vested rights and past transactions?" 2"
But Justice Story presumably got this part of the idea from the opinion of
Chancellor Kent in Dash v. VanKleeck,21 , oft-cited by Justice Story and others.
As with so much in our law, the idea probably originated in an opinion of Lord
Mansfield. Lord Mansfield wrote: "Here is a right vested: and it is not to be
imagined that the legislature could by general words mean to take it away from
the person in whom it was so legally vested, and who had been at a great deal of

205.
206.

See, e.g., Smith, supra note 110, at 419-20.
See United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2019 (1994).

207
208.

Such as a statute prospectively raising the speed limit.
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel m Foreign Parts v. Wheeler, 22 F Cas. 756, 767

(C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156).
209. As Sir Fortunatus Dwarrs wrote, laws cannot affect actions pnor to their enactment: "It
would be monstrous, were it otherwise." FORTUNATUS DwARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON
STATUTES: THEIR RULES OF CONSTRUCTION, AND THE PROPER BOUNDARIES OF LEGISLATION AND
OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 165 (1871).
210. See infra notes 224-39 and accompanying text.
211. Wheeler 22 F Cas. at 767
212. 7 Johns. 477, 5 Am. Dec. 291, 306-13 (N.Y 1811).

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 27

cost and charge in prosecuting." ' Disturbing a vested right is214thus considered
worse, more judicially heinous, than disturbing one not vested.
The difficulty with such an approach is that it simply transfers the question
onto the distinction between vested and un-vested. How does one decide that?
Slawson suggests that "vested rights retroactivity" "disturbs patterns of conduct
that represent substantial investments of labor or property" 215 However, this
approach does not fit well with cases such as Cummings and Garland. As the
dissent in Garland pointed out: "The right to practise law in the courts as a
and not an absolute right."2" 6
profession, is a privilege granted by the law,
Clearly, putting oneself in a position to apply to practice law requires a
"substantial investments of labor and property "27 Munzer suggests that, when
societal background rules reject the retroactivity, then the expectations disturbed
by it are entrenched, i.e., vested.2"' But this reasoning is obviously circular:
how do we decide when to reject the retroactivity? Circular question begging is
exactly the problem with such a definitional approach. As we learned in property
and contracts, "vesting" is used to decide when the risk of loss passes, and is

213. Couch v. Jeffines, 98 Eng. Rep. 290, 291 (K.B. 1769). See Williams v. Pntchard, 100
Eng. Rep. 862, 862 (K.B. 1790).
214. Justice Swayne, one of the dissenters in Cummings and Garland,considered this to be
fundamental:
This is a pnnciple of universal jurisprudence. It is necessary to the repose and welfare of
all communities. A different rule would shake the social fabnc to its foundations and let in
a flood tide of intolerable evils. It would be contrary to 'the general principles of law and
reason' and to one of the most vital ends of government.
Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654, 662 (1871). See DwARRiS, supra note 209, at 162
(discussing Westevelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 202, 211-12 (1854) (holding the legislature could not
deprive the husband of his legacy where the legacy to the wife was effective before the Manned
Women's Property Act but she was not to take possession until after the act); Ray A. Brown, Vested
Rights and the Portal-to-PortalAct, 46 MICH. L. REV 723, 723-24 n.50 (1948) ("Congress cannot
abrogate previously vested rights."); Ray H. Greenblatt, JudicialLimitations on Retroactive Civil
it is legally
Legislation, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 540, 561 (1956) ("If the right is 'vested'
protectible, at least for purposes of the rule of construction and probably for purposes of the due
process limitation as well."); Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEx. L.
REV 425, 439 (1982) (drawing a virtually isomorphic distinction under the new and portentous
name "Entrenchment and Disentrenchment"); Slawson, supra note 191, at 218 ("If the effect of a
law is substantially to disturb patterns of conduct that represent substantial investments in labor or
property or to remove valuable nghts, rights of action or even liberties, then the law is 'retroactive'
in [the vested rights] sense.").
215. Slawson, supra note 191, at 218 (citing FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958));
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No.
13,156)).
216. Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 384 (1866) (Miller, J., dissenting).
217. Slawson, supra note 191, at 218 (citing FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958);
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No.
13,156)).
218. Munzer, supra note 214, at 439.
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readily manipulable to that end. That is, "vesting" has little intrinsic content of
its own, it merely labels decisions. As Greenblatt correctly puts it: "[the] vested
rights approach is stultifying, for judicial analysis seems to end with scrutiny of
the right so ignoring other real considerations." 9
Practical analyses of legal imperatives often come down to us m the form of
maxims, or canons of construction, and so it is with retroactivity Probably the
earliest statement from the U.S. Supreme Court is in United States v. The
Schooner Peggy 220 wherein the Court stated that "it is true that m mere private
cases between individuals, a court will and ought to struggle hard against a
construction which will, by retrospective operation, affect the rights of the
parties. ''22i

An extensive form of the maxim is given in the oft-cited treatise

222
on statutes, Potter's Dwams:

The American authorities are quite uniform on the retroactive effect of statutes.
The general rule is, that no statute, however positive m its terms, is to be construed
as designed to interfere with existing contracts, rights of action or suits, and
especially vested rights, unless the intention that it shall so operate is expressly
declared, and courts will apply new statutes only to future cases, unless there is
something in the very nature of the case, or in the language of the new provision,
which shows that they were intended to have a retroactive operation.Y2

To this day, the maxim instructs courts to begin their analyses with the
understanding that a statute applies from its date of enactment prospectively only
unless it expressly states otherwise. Potter mentions other exceptions, the most
common of which is curative legislation? 24 The 225
classic example is given by
Justice Willes in the English case, Phillips v. Eyre:

219. Greenblatt, supra note 214, at 561.
220. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
221. Id. at 110. See United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806) ("Words in a
statute ought not to have retrospective operation, unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative,
that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot
otherwise be satisfied."); Dash v. VanKleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 5 Am. Dec. 291, 308 (N.Y 1811) ("The
very essence of a new law is a rule for future cases.
A statute ought never to receive such a
construction if it be susceptible of any other
"); Phillips v. Eyre, 6 Q.B. 1, 23 (1870)
("Accordingly, the Court will not ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting nghts, unless
by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the
legislature.").
222. See, e.g., Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 385 (1878) (citing DwAREIS, supra note 209,
at 162-63 n.9).
223.

DWARRJS, supra note 209, at 162-63 n.9.

224. Id. Francis Bacon also mentions curative legislation as permissible. In a section captioned
"Of the RetroactiveAspect ofLaws," he writes that retroactive laws "must be used seldom, and with
great caution; for we approve not of a Janus m laws." BACON, supra note 169, at 97 (aphorism 47).
But he allows such law if necessary to reach a person "who evades and narrows the words or
meaning of a law by fraud and cavil
who plots to deceive and upset present laws
" Id.
(aphorism 48). In the next aphorism he expressly says that confirmatory laws, making express what
had been previously understood are valid although retroactive. Id. (aphorism 49).
225. 6 Q.B. 1 (1870).
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One instance of retrospective legislation obviously just, to render valid the acts of
persons who had fallen honestly into error, and by which mfinite actions were killed
m embryo, may suffice. When the result of the judgment, finally affirmed by the
House of Lords, in the Queen v. Millis, 10 CI.& F 534, was to declare null and
void numerous marriages celebrated in Ireland by Presbyterian ministers and others
not episcopally ordained, one effect of the decisions was to disclose, by the new
light thrown upon the relations of families previously supposed to be legitimate, a
prospect of vast and interminable litigation, springing from a host of vested rights
of action of every description. This result was averted (in so far as it was possible
without making persons liable to prosecution who were not so liable before) by the
Acts 5 & 6 Vict. c.113, 6 & 7 Vict. c.39, and 7 & 8 Vict. c.81, s.83. By these
beneficial and just statutes the past marriages were ratified and confirmed from the
beginning, for it was in terms enacted that they should "that they be adjudged and
taken to have been and to be" of the same force and effect as if canonically had and
solemnized. 6
Such curative legislation affirms as proper what everyone had taken to be the law
anyway- it "restores a situation that was affirmatively anticipated and provided
for." 2" The contrast is with:
The retrospective Attainder Acts of earlier times, when the principles of law were
not so well understood or so closely regarded as in the present day, and which are
now looked upon as barbarous and loosely spoken of as ex post facto laws, were
of a substantially different character. They did not confirm irregular acts, but
avoided and punished what had been lawful when done.'
The Supreme Court has had many occasions to address such curative
legislation, the nearest to seminal being United States v Heinszen & Co. 229
Plaintiff Hemszen had paid tariffs on goods it imported into the Philippine
Islands. 230 The tariffs were exacted by the military administration, but before
Congress statutorily authorized,2 1 or later ratified the pnor tariffs. 2 3 2 Without
ratification "it is obvious that the court below correctly held that such tariff
exactions were illegal. 233 So the question was square: what was the effect of
the ratification? Hemszen tried to frame the argument in terms of Congress
having power "to retroactively impose tariff duties upon the consummated act of
bnnging the goods into that country?" 234 That, the Court said, begs the

226. Id. at 24-25 (citations omitted).
227 Slawson, supra note 191, at 239. See Frederick A. Ballard, Retroactive FederalTaxation,
48 HARv L. REv. 592, 596 (1935).
228. Phillips, 6 Q.B. at 25.
229. 206 U.S. 370 (1907).
230. Id. at 382.
231. Id. at 378.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 382.
234.

Id. at 385.
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question, because the tariffs were exacted at the time the act was done (when the
goods were imported) and had been passed along to retail customers. " Also,
the tariffs would have been legal but for a failure of proper delegation. 236 The
Court attributed to legislatures a very general power of ratification: validation of
prior official action is allowed, if it comes under some exception.2 37 The
Supreme Court followed this argument in subsequent cases, such as Charlotte
Harbor& Northern Railway Co. v. Welles, 38 although not without limit.239
There is a pattern here: the curative legislation that is approved is always of
prior actions thought by the parties to be legal when taken, but subsequently
found defective because of some collateral problem. It is easy to see how
allowing this kind of curative retroactivity is junsprudentially moffensive.
There is a similar vein, namely retroactive interpretive statutes, that is a little
less clearly proper. In Stockdale v. The Insurance Companies,2" the paradigm
case, the Supreme Court upheld a retroactive statutory gloss on a prior
statute. 4' Despite the usual role of legislatures to make law and of courts to
construe it, a legislature, the Court said, has the power by statute to "declare the
construction of previous statutes so as to bind the courts in reference to all
transactions occurring after the passage of the laws." 42 The Court said this
power is not without limit, but the limit suggested ignores any retroactive impact:
"Congress cannot, under cover of giving a construction to an existing or an
expired statute, invade private rights, with which it could not interfere by a new
or affirmative statute." '43 It was on just this point that three justices
dissented.2" Justice Strong wrote:
I know that acts declaratory of the meaning of former acts are not uncommon.
They are always to be regarded with respect, as expressive of legislative opinion,
and, so far as they can operate on subsequent transactions, they are of binding force.
But it is well settled they cannot operate to disturb rights vested or acquired before
their enactment, or to impose penalties for acts done before their passage, acts
lawful when they were done. It is always presumed the legislature had no intention
to give them such an effect.2" 5

235.
236.
237
238.
239.

Id.
Id. at 383-84.
Id. at 384-85.
260 U.S. 8, 11-12 (1922).
See Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338, 339-40 (1922). This
case preceded Charlotte Harborin the 1922 term. Charlotte Harborpurports to distinguish Forbes
Pioneer Boat Line, but the grounds used are somewhere between nebulous and spurious. Charlotte
Harbor 260 U.S. at 11-12. See Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 426-27 (1931).
240. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 323 (1873).
241. Id. at 333.
242. Id. at 331.
243. Id. at 332.
244. Id. at 336 (Strong, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 340 (Strong, J., dissenting).
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Given the broad scope for judgment as to whether prior rights have indeed been
impacted by a subsequent interpretation, it is difficult to see this particular issue
ever being resolvable in formulaic fashion.
The other general class of exceptions to the basic interpretive maxim suggested
by the actual outcome of The Schooner Peggy is simply geo-political
necessity 246 The Trumbull, a United States man-o -war, had captured the
French schooner Peggy 247 The Peggy claimed not to be an enemy, but a mere
merchantman, and that the United States and France had a treaty covenng her,
albeit retroactvely. 24 Ultimately, the Supreme Court found in favor of The
Peggy, reversing the Circuit Court, because of the importance of the treaty with
France and the great national concern about international relations and the rights
of war. 249 Similar, and even more compelling, is Justice Willes' story of the
dashing Captain Denman, who, in 1841, was sent by the governor of Sierra Leone
to rescue to British subjects being kept in slavery in Gallinas "by a native
chief."' 250 In doing so, Captain Denman freed 300 slaves and wrecked a bit of
ratified
property for which he was later sued.25 "The Queen's government
to
and confirmed what had been done, and that ratification was rightly held
have the effect of exempting Captain Denman from all responsibility ,212 One
might consider these exceptions to be simply "brute force," always available for
cases of extreme moral, social, or political necessity 253
With these two classes of exceptions, then, the standard maxim of interpretation
has remained the basic analytic device. Absent extreme socio-political necessity,
and unless curative, a statute is to be read as operating prospectively only But
what of statutes that expressly, by their own terms, operate from a date prior to
their date of enactment?
Maxims of interpretation allocate burdens of proof, or of persuasion: The
maxim holds unless there is good reason to the contrary A maxim puts the
burden on the party seeking the contrary to come forward and persuade the court.

246. United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109-10 (1801). See United
States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
247 The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 103.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 109-10.
250. See Phillips v. Eyre, 6 Q.B. 1, 24 (1870).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. At least one of the founding fathers, George Mason, foretold this sort of necessity, and
thought it a basis for opposing the adoption of a written constitution:
Both the general legislature and the State Legislatures are expressly prohibited making ex
post facto laws; tho' there never was, or can be a Legislature but must & will make such
laws, when necessity and the public Safety require them; which will hereafter be a Breach
of all the Constitutions in the Union, and afford precedents for other Innovations.
George Mason's Essay on Objection to the Constitution of Government Framed by the Convention
(1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 11, 13 (Herbert J. Stonng ed., 1981).
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On this argument, we can begin analysis of expressly retroactive statutes with an
allocation of the burden of persuasion.
Notwithstanding the present Supreme Court's indifference, retro-dating the
effectiveness of a statute to before its enactment is primafacie improper. In cases
of such legislation, including proposals for it, the burden of justification should
be on the defender (or proponent). On the other hand, no unusual burden should
fall on the defender or proponent of prima facie prospective legislation; lawmaking in the present political climate is sufficiently difficult without such added
inhibition.
But, retroactive effects of sufficient magnitude should, if
demonstrated, count as damning.
Given the allocation of burdens of persuasion, what sort of criteria should count
toward making the argument? The first, and most obvious, place to look is to the
main sources of the general abhorrence of retroactive law-making. "Reliance"
and its near relation "notice" help: One cannot be bound by a law of which one
could not have notice and, correspondingly, one ought to be able to rely on law
of which one takes notice as a guide to present behavior. These terms do not
distinguish the two kinds of retroactivity" The law not yet having been enacted
at the time in question, nobody could have notice of it, and, in either type of
retroactivity, the victim acted, if at all, in reliance on a prior state of the law
Whether the change be by retroactive substitution of another law, or by
subsequent denial of the benefits of the action, would seem to matter little to the
victim. But on these grounds we can eliminate a large class of laws from these
objections, namely those governing behavior which does not depend on legal
guidance.
One would not ordinarily seek advice as to the state of the law before deciding
whether negligently to inflict emotional distress. Nor would one even look to the
state of warranty law before buying a newspaper-no more than would the news
vendor seek advice before selling it, or before replacing. it if it had no print on the
inside pages. In matters of the decencies of everyday life, even in the
sophistication of today's commercial world, notice comes from what it is to
behave as a reasonable person, and reliance is on other persons' doing so. Resort
to the statute books is hardly relevant. Most behavior is probably of this kind.
2 54
With respect to legal governance, we might call it "non-reliance" behavior.
If the legislature seeks to change a current practice of social life, it has to give
notice, clearly and loudly Otherwise, everyone will go on doing what they were
used to doing anyway '55 A legislated retroactive revolution m non-reliance
behavior seems oxymoronic. But there are also statutes that restate what had been
the accepted standards of behavior in the community Such statutes, when
applicable to non-reliance behavior, need little notice, and retro-dating seems of

254. Of course, this sort of behavior is to be anthropologically, not legally, defined. What
counts as non-reliance behavior is determined, with perfect circularity, by what is non-reliance
behavior.
255. It seems very difficult to change social habits. Think of the governmental efforts to make
people drive at no more than 55 m.p.h. on highways. It was hugely publicized and hugely
unsuccessful. Even to this day, very few people have acquiesced.
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little significance. 6 Where reliance on and notice of the statute law is not of
practical importance, retroactivity becomes quite clearly demarcated: it should be
irrelevant or of dispositive consequence according to how the legislation in
question affirms or attempts to revise accepted social practice.
Retroactivity begins to matter when the behavior governed is of the kind that
people usually do not undertake without legal advice and planning. The two
examples used above illustrate. Estate planning is a paradigm area: for the most
part, decisions in. this area are governed by state probate and tax laws. For
example, the Uniform Code Commissioners, in their introductory essay to the
1993 revision of the Uniform Probate Code, state that "ease of administration and
predictability of result are prized features of the probate system. 25 7 Wisely, the
New Hampshire constitution would prevent a retro-dated change in the tax
structure.2 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Carlton,259 nobody can formulate and implement sensible plans except on a law
that is what it says it is. What would prevent the indirect method of achieving
the same end? If the federal government were acting, the law would be
constitutionally prohibited. As one commentator noted:
If the taxpayer has already completed the transaction, a tax upon the privilege
of consummating it is a contradiction m terms. The taxpayer has no choice in
the matter. [The tax] becomes in effect a direct assessment upon the property
itself simply because of ownership,
and as such is unconstitutional if
26
unapportioned among the states. 0
Apparently the indirect method, prohibited to the federal government, could be
used in New Hampshire absent Justice Story's argument.
The second example, the property developer who invests in seaside real estate
but is prevented from developing it by a subsequently enacted conservation law,

256.

It is for this reason that retroactivity of curative statutes, saying what everyone thought had

been said before, is felt to be more tolerable, less problematic than other types of retroactivity
statutes. See supra text accompanying notes 224-39.
257 IntroductoryEssay to U.P.C. (1993). Similarly, m Sullivan v. Burkzn, Justice Wilkins (one
of the intellectual leaders of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and the one who appears
to have made a specialty of estate planning and trust matters), writing for a unanimous court refused
to change the outdated and inequitable position of Kerwin v. Donaghy when he wrote: "The bar

has been entitled reasonably to rely on that rule [of Kerwin v. Donaghy] in advising clients. In the
area of property law, the retroactive invalidation of an established pnnciple is to be undertaken with
great caution." Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Mass. 1984) (citing Kerwin v. Donaghy,
59 N.E.2d 299 (Mass. 1945)).

258. N.H. CONST. art. I, § 23.
259. 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2023 (1994) ("An entirely prospective change in the law may disturb the
relied-upon expectations of individuals, but such a change would not be deemed therefore to be
violative of due process.").
260. Amberg, supra note 201, at 694-95. Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution
states: "[N]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid unless in Proportion to the Census or
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
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is obviously taken from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,26' addressed
by the Supreme Court in 1992. In Lucas, the Court found the deprivation of
economic value to be a taking which, if uncompensated, would violate the Fifth
Amendment.262 Justice Scalia wrote, "[WIhile property may be regulated to' 6a3
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
What is too far9 So far "we have generally eschewed any 'set formula"' for
determining how far is too far, preferring to "engag[e] in
essentially ad hoc,
factual inquines."2 4 But two situations are takings: (1) where the regulation
requires physical invasion; and (2) where it "denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of land. 2 65 As a means of policing retroactive legislation,
this is rather insensitive, but it is still an inhibition to a legislature grossly and
punitively abusing its power.
Deprived of the ex postfacto prohibition, it was not initially clear how courts
could police the abuse of retroactive civil legislation. But, by the end of the
nineteenth century, the natural law themes on which the founding fathers had
relied found a clear home in the due process provisions of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 266 Traces can be found as early as 1819 in the
opinions of Justice Johnson, but it was always clear that interpretation by the
Court was essential if the due process provisions were to mean anything at
all.267 In 1855, the Court affirmed this principle, writing:
The constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended

to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what pnnciples are to be applied to
ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest it was not left to the legislative
power to enact any process which rmght be devised.'6

The due69process clauses thus "protect the citizen against all mere acts of
power."'

261. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
262. Id. at 1019.
263. Id. at 1017
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law
"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("[N]or shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
").
267 See, e.g., Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819) ("[T]he good
sense of mankind has at last settled down to this: that [the due process provisions] were intended
to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by
established principles of private right and distributive justice.").
268. Murray's Lessees v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276

(1855) (determining that due process comes from the English tradition of common law and the
Magna Carta).
269. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y.
202, 212 (1854)).
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In 1933, this understanding of the role of the Due Process Clauses in our
government was given stable formulation by the Court: "[T]he guaranty of due
process
demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation
to the object sought to be attained. '270 What it means for a statute not to be
"unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious," or how the relationship between means
and ends is to be assessed in reality will vary substantially with the subject matter
and with the social attitudes prevalent at a particular time, and on a particular
court. But an early theme relevant to retroactivity was that, at the time of
enactment, those subject to legislation should be able to take some action to
protect themselves.2 1' Not surprisingly, the two traditional themes of notice and
reliance have been fundamental: without notice, one cannot protect oneself; and
actions taken in legitimate reliance on the prior state of the law ought not to be
upset by subsequent legislation.
That notice is necessary to the validity of law, at least m a morally legitimate
regime is, as has been pointed out, a fundamental of the oldest and most settled
jurisprudence.272 Our federal courts have held that the requirement of notice is
an integral factor in due process analysis. In Lambert v. California,"3 the Court
stated: "Engramed in our concept of due process is the requirement of
notice."274 One cannot have notice of a law yet to be enacted, so, as Blackstone
said, "All laws should therefore be made to commence in futoro, and be notified
before their commencement.""27 The notice requirement is closely connected
with reliance: one cannot plan one's affairs on the basis of laws one does not
know about,276 and one who relies on present law should not be accountable for
so doing when the law is changed. 7
270. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1933).
271. See Ochoa v. Hernandez Y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 153-54 (1913) (holding that legislation
affecting property while the owners "were infants and unable to protect themselves" was a violation
of the Due Process Clause).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 174-210.
273. 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957) (holding that a Los Angeles felon registration ordinance violated
due process when applied to an individual who lacked actual knowledge of her duty to register and
finding that if the Court were to uphold the ordinance, "the evil would be as great as it is when the
law is written in print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community").
274. Id. at 228 ("Notice is sometimes essential so that a citizen has a chance to defend charges.
Notice is required before property interests are disturbed, before assessments are made, before
penalties are assessed.").
275. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *46. See Smith, supra note 110, at 418-19.
276. See People v. Hudy, 538 N.Y.S.2d 197, 201 (N.Y App. Div. 1988) ("One purpose of the
rule is to assure that citizens have fair warning of what conduct will be punished so that they may
tailor their conduct accordingly.").
277. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977) ("To spell out intent in
1941 to evade a statutory requirement not enacted until 1967 attributes, at the very least, a
remarkable prescience to the employer."). The same principle also underlies the impetus to stability
in the doctrine of stare decisis. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2803 (1992); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932); Vallejo v.
Wheeler, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1017 (K.B. 1774).
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Reliance on law-law of which we have deliberately taken notice-is not an
ordinary part of everyday life.278 But for all those areas of social behavior in
which we seek advice, or look to statutes and precedent (tax planning, estate
planning, securities, and so on), for all the reliance areas, reliability of the law
is essential.' 79 If law cannot be relied on, all planned action becomes insecure
This is one of the greatest
and speculative, expectations uncertain.8"
jurisprudential deficiencies of ex postfacto legislation, a deficiency which makes
it so suspect under the Due Process Clauses."'
It follows that where there is no reliance on the law of the moment, a
retroactive change will do no harm. 2 Such was the case with the typical
curative legislation, at least in decisions through 1994, which made the law
conform retroactively to what people had mistakenly relied upon.28 3 A good
example came when the Supreme Court interpreted a statute so as to require
employers to pay huge amounts of arrearages in pay at overtime rates-a decision
which came as a surprise to all.2 4 Congress relieved the burden with the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, with an obviously retroactive effect.285 Yet
nobody, neither worker nor employer, had relied on the prior law as the Court
surprisingly interpreted it to be, so no settled rights were disturbed nor
expectations defeated; the courts upheld it against due process challenge. 286 It
would also follow that if a person had relied on the prior state of the law-the
state of the law retroactively displaced-but to no detriment, then there would be
no cause for complaint. The Supreme Court found this to be the case in United

278.

For example, we do not consult the law books or a lawyer about whether or not to commit

a tort like battery or negligent infliction of emotional distress. To do so would be simply absurd,
and similarly for (numencally) most contracts.
279. Lord Mansfield limited it to commerce when he stated: "In all mercantile transactions
the great object should be certainty: and therefore, it is of more consequence that a rule should be
certain, than whether the rule is established one way or the other. Because speculators in trade then
know what ground to go upon." Vallejo, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1017 (emphasis added).
280. See Lican v. Commissioner, 946 F.2d 690, 693 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Federal courts have long

been hostile to legislation that interferes with settled expectations.").
281. See William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633, 637 (1925);
United States v Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 408 (1806); Greenblatt, supra note 214, at 554;
Munzer, supra note 214, at 438; Slawson, supra note 191, at 225-26; Smith, supra note 110, at 418,
427.
282. Contra Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 157-58 (1913) (holding the retroactive

repeal of a compensation statute was an unconstitutional violation of the due process clause despite
the absence of reliance, because the right to compensation was a vested property nght).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 224-39. But see William Danzer & Co., 268 U.S. at
637.
284.

Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 691-93 (1946) (holding that the time

spent donnmg work clothes and walking to the work site was part of the work week).
285. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1985).
286. See Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 261-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 887 (1948). See also Greenblatt, supra note 214, at 554-60; Slawson, supra note 191, at 226-

27.
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States v. Heinszen & Co,2 7 where the costs of the retroactively established
import duty had been passed along to customers when incurred.2 In exactly
that vein, the Supreme Court demanded that taxpayers complaimng of a
retroactive imposition of a sales tax show that they had incurred a loss and not
simply passed the cost of the tax along to their buyers because
retroactivity is of
2 89
no harm to a person who has already been repaid the cost.
Prior to 1994 and United States v. Carlton,290 the most important recent case
was Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. 291 This case is a clear progenitor of
Carlton, beginning a progression towards the present disregard for retroactivity.
At issue was a federal statute requiring coal mine operators to pay benefits to
miners who had incurred or died from "black lung disease" and their dependents
a statute with clearly retroactive effects.292 The majority's argument began as
if there were no difference between retroactive and prospective legislation, placing
the burden on the complainant to show the legislation is "arbitrary and
irational."'2 93 However, the Court immediately drew a sharp distinction
between retroactive and prospective legislation: 294 "It does not follow, however,
that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively The
retrospective aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet
the test of due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the
former."295 What, then, is the peculiarity of retrospective legislation that
warrants a different standard of due process from prospective legislation?
"[T]he justification for the retrospective imposition of liability must take into
account the possibilities that the Operators may not have known of the danger
and that even if they did know of the danger their conduct may have been taken
in reliance upon the current state of the law, which imposed no liability "296
One could hardly wish for a clearer, more explicit acknowledgement of the
critical role that reliance plays in assessing retroactivity under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Upholding the retroactive
aspects of the statute as constitutional then required a special argument.2 97

287 206 U.S. 370 (1907).
288. Id. at 385.
289. United States v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 386, 402 (1934) ("[There is no]
infringement of due process of law. If the taxpayer has borne the burden of the tax, he can readily
show it.
If he has shifted the burden to the purchasers, they
are the real parties m
interest.').
290. 114 S.Ct. 2018 (1994).
291. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
292. Id. at 5-6.
293. Id. at 15-16.
294. Id. at 16-17.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 17.
297. The Court was able to uphold the retroactivity of the statute on the theory that it placed
a fair allocation of the burden of suffering on those involved as the Court found that the statute was
"a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited
from the fruits of their labor-the operators and the coal consumers." Id. at 18.
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In two subsequent cases, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray &

Co.,29 and United States v. Sperry Corp.,299 the Court followed Usery in this
procedure. Both focused explicitly on the retroactive aspects of the statutes in
question as being distinct from the prospective aspects.3°° Interestingly, in all
three of these cases it is difficult to find any actual ex ante reliance.
The trend started in Usery definitely was more generous to legislatures m
drawing due process limits. But none of these cases went so far as to disregard
the retroactive aspect as such and its distinguishing marks, absence of notice and
detrimental reliance. For that we had to wait until Carlton.
I.

CARLTON AND ITS IMMEDIATE PREDECESSORS

In United States v. Carlton,30' the Supreme Court changed course, without
saying it was doing so, and upheld against a due process challenge a retroactive
amendment to the Tax Reform Act (TRA)." 2 The retroactive amendment
removed an estate tax deduction (the ESOP proceeds deduction),0 3 which,
under pre-amendment law, was available to estates that made "qualified sale[s]"

to employee stock-ownership plans (ESOPs). 304

The relevant statute in Carlton, the TRA of 1986, became law on October 22,
1986.305 Section 1172 of the TRA, codified as section 2057, allowed an estate

298. 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
299. 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
300. In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of
1980 had explicit retroactive application, justified intentionally by the felt need to inhibit the exodus
of employers from pension plans because of the greater burdens it imposed. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp., 467 U.S. at 723-24, 730-31 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (1980)). One might
properly hold one's nose at this, but it is an argument specifically and explicitly about the
retroactive aspects only. Sperry Corp. dealt with the allocation of funds from the settlement of the
Iranian cnsis in 1979-81. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. at 55-56. The retroactivity was justified by the
need to allocate burdens equitably among the various claimants to the limited funds available. Id.
at 64. A rationale somewhat similar to that was used in Usery'v. Turner Elkhorn Mining. See
Usery, 428 U.S. at 18. Again, the focus of this part of the argument was explicitly on the
retroactivity. All the cases were said to be concerned with federal economic policy, and "the strong
deference accorded legislation in the field of national economic policy is no less applicable when
the legislation is applied retroactively." Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 467 U.S. at 729. It is
rather difficult to envision what federal legislation is not concerned with national economic policy.
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1657 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
301. 114 S.Ct. 2018 (1994).
302. Id. at 2024.
303. Id. at 2021.
304. Id. at 2020.
305. Id. Section 1172(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 provided the following:

SEc. 2057.

SALES OF EMPLOYER SECURITIES TO EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS OR
WORKER-OWNED COOPERATIVES.

(a) General rule.
For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the taxable estate shall be
determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to 50 percent
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of the qualified proceeds of a qualified sale of employer securities.
(b)
Qualified sale.
For purposes of this section, the term "qualified sale" means any sale of employer securities
by the executor of an estate to(1) an employee stock ownership plan described in section 4975(e)(7), or
(2) an eligible worker-owned cooperative (within the meaning of section 1042(c)).
(c)
Qualified proceeds.
For purposes of this section(1) In general. The term "qualified proceeds" means the amount received by the estate
from the sale of employer securities at any time before the date on which the return of
the tax mposed by section 2001 is required to be filed (including any extensions).
(2) Proceeds from certain securities not qualified. The term "qualified proceeds" shall not
include the proceeds from the sale of any employer securities if such securities were
received by the decedent(A) in a distribution from a plan exempt from tax under section 501(a) which meets
the requirements of section 401(a), or
(13) as a transfer pursuant to an option or other right to acquire stock to which section
83, 422, 422A, 423, or 424 applies.
(d)
Qualified proceedsfrom qualified sales.
(1) In general. For purposes of this section, the proceeds of a sale of employer securities
by an executor to an employee stock ownership plan or an eligible worker-owned
cooperative shall not be treated as qualified proceeds from a qualified sale unless(A) the decedent directly owned the securities immediately before death, an
(B) after the sale, the employer securities(i) are allocated to participants, or
(ii) are held for future allocation in connection with(I) an exempt loan under the rules of section 4975, or
(II) a transfer of assets under the rules of section 4980(c)(3).
(2) No substitution permitted. For purposes of paragraph (1)(B), except in the case of a
bona fine business transaction (e.g., a substitution of employer securities m connection
with a merger of employers), employer securities shall not be treated as allocated or held
for future allocation to the extent that such securities are allocated or held for future
allocation in substitution of other employer securities that had been allocated or held for
future allocation.
(e)
Written statement required.
(1) In general. No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) unless the executor
of the estate of the decedent files with the Secretary the statement described in paragraph
(2).
(2) Statement. A statement is described in this paragraph if it is a verified written
statement of(A) the employer whose employees are covered by the plan described in subsection
(b)(1), or
(B) any authorized officer of the cooperative described in subsection (b)(2), consenting
to the application of section 4979A with respect to such employer or cooperative.
(f)
Employer securities.
For purposes of this section, the term "employer securities" has the meaning given such
term by section 409(1).
(g)
Termination.
This section shall not apply to any sale after December 31, 1991.
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tax deduction for half the proceeds of "any sale of employer securities by the
executor of an estate" 3 to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)." 7 In
December 1986, Jerry Carlton, executor of the estate of Willametta K. Day,
relying on section 2057, purchased "employer securities," sold them to an ESOP
at a loss of $631,000, and claimed a deduction on the estate tax return.30 8 In
January 1987, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Notice 87-13, stating,
inter alia, that pending the adoption of clarifying legislation, the IRS would only
recognize deductions claimed under section 2057 where the decedent had "directly
owned" the securities before death. 3' Following the IRS's lead, Congress
amended section 2057 in December 1987--one year after the pertinent facts in
Carlton had occurred. 1 The 1987 amendment provided that in order to qualify
for the deduction, the secunties sold to an ESOP must have been directly owned
The amendment applied
by the decedent "immediately before death..' ..
retroactively as if it had appeared m the original version of the TRA of 1986,"2
and Carlton's deduction was denied. 3

The estate was left with a loss of

$63 1,000.314

Carlton, as executor, paid taxes on the proceeds of the ESOP transaction and
subsequently filed a refund claim with the IRS.315 When the IRS denied his
refund claim, Carlton filed a refund action in district court.316 The district court
granted the government's summary judgment motion,3" 7 but the Ninth Circuit
318
reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment m Carlton's favor.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the Ninth Circuit
applied an "unduly strict standard" to the December 1987 retroactive amendment
While acknowledging that the executor had neither
of section 2057 319
constructive nor actual notice that the 1986 version of section 2057 would be
retroactively amended, and that the he detrimentally relied on the plain meaning

26 U.S.C. § 2057 (1986) (repealed 1989).
306. 26 U.S.C. § 2057(b) (1986) (repealed 1989).
307 Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2020 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (1986) (repealed 1989)).
308. Id. at 2021.
309. I.R.S. Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 432, 442-43.
310. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10,411, 101 Stat.
1330, 1330-432 (1987) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (1987) (repealed 1989)).
311. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10,41 l(d), 101 Stat.
1330, 1330-432 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (1987) (repealed 1989)).
312. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10,411 (b), 101 Stat.
1330, 1330-432 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (1987) (repealed 1989)) ("The
amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the amendments made by
section 1172 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.").
313. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992).
314. United States v. Carlton, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2021 (1994).
315. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055.
316. Id.
317 Id.
318. Id. at 1062.
319. Carlton, 114 S.Ct. at 2024.
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of the 1986 version of section 2057,320 the Court held constitutional the 1987
amendment's retroactive application using the lowest due process standard.3"'
The retroactive application was supported by a legitimate legislative purpose
furthered by rational means.3 2 Thus, the Court applied the same low-level
retroactive tax legislation as it does
constitutional standard-rationality review-to
323
to prospective economic legislation.
In the light of the prior history of retroactivity jurisprudence, both in and out
of the Supreme Court, this decision is more than mildly surprising. But before
further exploring the rationales offered in the opinions, we briefly review
Carlton s predecessors in the area of taxation. This review puts Carlton in the
appropriate precedential context as well as showing the continuity of underlying
thought in tax and non-tax retroactivity law, at least through the spring of 1994.
In the late 1920s, Justice McReynolds324 authored a string of opinions m
which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down retroactive gift tax statutes. 32 5 The
first, Nichols v. Coolidge,326 involved a gift tax in the amount of
$34,662.65. 327 Between 1907 and 1917, Mrs. Coolidge and her husband
transferred real estate and personal property to trustees,328 income to the
settlors. 329 The Coolidges also transferred property directly to their five
children with a lease back provision at nominal rent and with a provision for
annual renewals until notice to the contrary 330 At Mrs. Coolidge's death m
1921, most of the property the trustees had held had passed out of their

320.
321.

Id.
Id.

322.

Id. ("Because we conclude that retroactive application of the 1987 amendment to § 2057

is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose, we conclude that the amendment as applied
to Carlton's 1986 transactions is consistent with the Due Process Clause.'). See Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,91 (1978) (applying rationality standard
to a statute limiting to $560 million the aggregate liability of the atomic energy industry for a single
nuclear accident); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (applying rationality standard
to prospective legislation that made it a misdemeanor to engage in the business of debt adjustment
except as incident to the lawful practice of law); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88
(1955) (applying rationality standard to prospective legislation, which, inter alia, prevented opticians
from fitting eyeglasses into frames without a prescnption from an ophthalmologist or optometrist).
323. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2023. See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 93; Ferguson, 372 U.S.
at 726; Williamson, 348 U.S. at 491.
324. Associate Justice from 1914-1941 and a "staunch conservative
[who above] all
opposed the growing social and economic regulatory power of government and believed that the
Constitution fairly committed the nation to a policy of laissez-faire capitalism." KERMIT L. HALL,
542-43 (1992).
325. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445 (1928); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147
(1927); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1927).
326. 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
327 Id. at 533.
328. Id.
329. Id.
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

330.

Id.
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possession. 331 But in 1919, Congress amended the federal estate tax law 332
The government insisted that the transfers in question came within section 402(c)
of the amendment, which taxed as part of a decedent's gross estate transfers
"intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after [the decedent's]
death 333 (whether such transfer or trust [was] made or created before or after the
passage of th~e] act)." 3 4
In Nichols, the Court held that the retroactive gift tax statute in question was
so arbitrary and capricious that it amounted to confiscation and thus offended the
Fifth Amendment. 335 The Court considered that the transferor: (1) had no
constructive or actual notice that Congress would tax as part of her estate
transfers that would not take effect in possession until after her death; 336 (2) that
the transferor had acted in good faith, i.e., the gifts had not been made in
contemplation of death to avoid estate tax; 337 and (3) that the grantees' interests
had been vested, and thus were beyond recall, for as long as twelve years before
the 1919 statute was enacted. 338 Congress' legitimate purpose for imposing the
tax was alone insufficient to save the retroactivity of the statute.339
In the next term, m Blodgett v. Holden," the Court again entertained the
question of whether Congress had the power to tax gifts made before the relevant
tax measure had been proposed to the legislature.34' In January 1924, Blodgett
made inter vivos gifts, not in contemplation of death, of property valued at over
$ 8 5 0 ,0 0 0 .2

The relevant gift tax provision was presented to Congress on

February 25, 19241 3 and became effective June 2, 1924.3"

331.

The tax applied

Id.

332. Id. at 534. The amendment was codified as the Revenue Act of February 24, 1919.
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1097 (1919).
333. Such transfers were to be taxed according to their value at the time of the grantor's death.
Nichols, 274 U.S. at 533.
334. Id. at 534-35 n.* (quoting Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(c), 40 Stat. 1057 1097-98
(1919)).
335. Id. at 542-43.
336. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542 (1927).
337 Id. ("The statute requires the executors to pay an excise ostensibly laid upon transfer of
property by death from Mrs. Coolidge to them but reckoned upon its value plus the value of other
property conveyed before the enactment in entire good faith and without contemplation of death.").
338. Id. at 533, 538.
339. Id. at 540-43 (explaining that although Congress may properly attempt to equalize taxation
of testamentary dispositions whether such dispositions were made by will or intestacy or were
merely testamentary in effect, the "mere desire to equalize taxation cannot justify a burden on
something not within congressional power"). The Court cited Frick v. Pennsylvania to illustrate
that Congress attempted to do through the "back door," what it could not properly do through the
"front door," i.e., Congress attempted to measure a tax upon dispositions of property that Congress

had no
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

power to tax. Id. at 540-41 (citing Fnck v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 494 (1925)).
275 U.S. 142 (1927).
Id. at 147
Id. at 146.
Id. at 146-47
Id. at 145.
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retroactively, as if it were effective January 1, 1924." 5 The Court relied on
Nichols and held that the June 2nd statute was arbitrary and invalid under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.346 The Court reasoned: "It seems
wholly unreasonable that one who, in entire good faith and without the slightest
premonition of such consequence, made absolute disposition of his
347 property by
gifts should thereafter be required to pay a charge for so doing.Later in the same term, in Untermyer v. Anderson,"4s the Court again
considered a taxpayer's constitutional challenge to the Act of June 2, 1924." 9
Isaac Untermyer made gifts on May 23, 1924-ten days before the Act in
question became effective and eighty-eight days after the bill was introduced in
Congress.350 The Court said that Blodgett and Untermyer were analogous, and
to the extent the cases were distinguishable, the differences were not material.51
The main difference was that Blodgett made his transfers before the provisions
were presented to Congress, 352 thus possibly without notice of the prospective
change in law, whereas Untermyer made his transfers three months after the
presented to Congress and while the conference report on the
provisions had been
353
bill was pending.
Congress made the challenged gift tax provisions applicable to gifts made
during the entire 1924 calendar year, but the Court held that "so far as applicable
to bona fide gifts not made in anticipation of death and fully consummated prior
to June 2, 1924, those provisions [were] arbitrary and invalid under the [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause of the Fifth Amendment.

' 354

The Court explained that the

mere fact that the gifts were made while the relevant provisions were in the final
stage of progress through the legislature was insufficient to either distinguish
355
Untermyer from Blodgett or to remove the arbitrary nature of the statute.
Accepting any other view would have created banrers to both the interpretation
and practical application of the statute and would have prevented understanding
of the burden imposed." 6 As m Nichols and Blodgett, the Court pointed out
357
the taxpayer's interest in knowing when and how he becomes liable for taxes.

345.
346.

Id. (citing Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319-24, 43 Stat. 253, 313-16 (1924)).
Id. at 147 Four of the justices believed that the statute was unconstitutional because

retroactive. Id. at 144-47 Meanwhile, four other justices believed that the statute was inapplicable.
Id. at 147-49.
347.

Id. at 147.

348.

276 U.S. 440 (1928).

349.

Id. at 444.

350.

Id. ("Untermyer made his gift

some three months after [the retroactive tax] provisions

were first presented and while the conference report upon the bill was pending.").
351. Id. at 445.
352. Id. at 444. See Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 146-47 (1927).
353. Untermyer 276 U.S. at 444. The report entered the Senate on May 22, 1924 and passed
both houses on May 25, 1924. Id. at 444-45.
354. Id. at 445.

355.

Id.

356.

Id.

357.

Id.
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Thus, where the taxpayer "cannot foresee and ought not to be required to guess
the outcome of the pending measures," Congress must notify the taxpayer of his
obligations.35 Also, because the "future of every bill while before Congress is
necessarily uncertain," the taxpayer is not liable until Congress has definitively
expressed its will through final action.359 The pattern so far is clear: notice and
reliability are essential to the taxpayer and must be respected by the legislature.
In 1930, Justice McReynolds authored the opinion in Cooper v. United
States36 in which the Court upheld a retroactive income tax statute, the
Revenue Act of 1921 .36' The Court's reasoning might have been anticipated.
On November 1, 1921, Mrs. Cooper's husband transferred to her stock with a fair
market value of $210 per share, whuch he had purchased in 1918 at $113.50 per
share.362 On November 7, 1921, Mrs. Cooper sold the stock at $210 per share
and recognized $36,670 as gain derived from the sale.363 She paid income taxes
for364the capital gains with the 1918 price as basis, but brought suit to recover
lt.

Had the legislation in question not been retroactive, she would have been able
to recover the tax.365 But the statute was made effective January 1, 1921. 3
The key section required a transfer of basis from donor to donee for gifts made
after December 31, 1920.367
Mrs. Cooper challenged this retroactive
application.368 Citing Nichols, Blodgett, and Untermyer, she argued that section
202(a) should not have been construed as applicable to transactions completed
before the enactment of the statute and that if the section were construed to apply
where both gift and sale were completed before such enactment, the section was
arbitrary and capricious, and thus, violated the Due Process Clause. 369 But, the
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
(1921)).
366.
367

Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1928).
Id. at 446.
280 U.S. 409 (1930).
Id. at 412.
Id. at 410.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Revenue Act of November 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 202(a)(2), 42 Stat. 227, 229
Id.
Id. The key section is Section 202(a) which provided:

That the basis for ascertaining the gain derived or loss sustained from a sale or other

disposition of property, real, personal, or mixed, acquired after February 28, 1913, shall be
the cost of such property; except that
(2) In the case of such property, acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, the basis shall
be the same as that which it would have in the hands of the donor or the last preceding

owner by whom it was not acquired by gift
Id. (quoting Revenue Act of November 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 202(a), 42 Stat. 227, 229 (1921)).
368. Id. at 411.
369. Id. (citing Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142
(1927); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927)).
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Court distinguished those recent cases. 370 Justice McReynolds stated: "None of
these cases is in point; they give no consideration to the power of Congress to
require that taxable income should include profits from transactions consummated
within the year."'371 Apparently, the Court viewed the holdings m the earlier
gift tax cases narrowly, i.e., as not dispositive m retroactive income tax cases.372
The following year, 1931, the Supreme Court decided Milliken v United
States, 373 another case involving the retroactive gift tax statute at issue in
Nichols. 374 In December, 1916, petitioner's decedent made inter vivos transfers
of stock to his children.375 The transferor died March 5, 1920.376 The
government considered the gifts to have been made m contemplation of
death.37
So, under section 402(c) of the Revenue Act of 1918, the
Commissioner included the stock m the decedent's estate and collected the
tax.378 The rates m the retroactive amendment, the 1918 Act, were higher than
those in the original version of the statute, the 1916 Act.379 Petitioners
challenged the tax as being "illegally exacted under the decedent's estates
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1918. ' 3t0 Section 402(c) provided for the
inclusion of the value of property in the gross estate:
[T]o the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made

a transfer
m contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after his death (whether such transfer or trust is made or created
before or after the passage of this act).?

The Court relied on, inter alia, dicta in Nichols in holding that the inclusion in
the gross estate of the value of gifts made in contemplation of death to secure
equality of taxation and to prevent evasion of taxes is a permissible classification
of an appropnate subject of taxation.38 2

370. Cooper v. United States, 280 U.S. 409, 411-12 (1930).
371. Id. at 412.
372. The Court, however, suggested that the tax year of enactment was the limit of permissible
retroactivity. Id. at 411-12. The one year limitation was to be taken up by Justice O'Connor in
Carlton; but what its justification was and accordingly whether it could, on that basis, be applicable
to the Carlton facts-an income tax case-requires further explanation, at least as of 1930. See
United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2025 (1994).
373. 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
374. Id. at 19-20 (analyzing the applicability of the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402(c), 40
Stat. 1057, 1097 (1919)).
375. Id. at 18. At that time, the Revenue Act of September 8, 1916 was in effect. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 19.
378. Id. (noting that under section 402(c) of the Revenue Act of 1918, for purposes of the tax,
the stock was valued at the time of the decedent's death).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 18.
381. Id. at 19.
382. Id. at 20. The Court considered the nature of both the tax and the decedent's gift. Id. at
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The Court upheld the 1918 statute 383 stating: "Underlying the present statute
is the policy of taxing
gifts [made in contemplation of death] equally with
testamentary dispositions, for which they may be substituted, and the prevention
of evasion of estate taxes by gifts made before, but in contemplation of
death."3 4 Here, the Court determined that public policy, as well as the parallel
1916 gift and estate tax rate and valuation provisions, gave the decedent notice
of the taxes that would be assessed on the particular gifts, and thus, that the
decedent took a risk in making the transfers." 5
In 1938, the Supreme Court clarified this apparent muddle in Welch v.
Henr3 86 when it returned to the question of the constitutionality of a retroactive
income tax provision. 38 7 The Wisconsin statute at issue imposed a tax on
dividend income that had formerly been excluded from taxation.388 According
to the Court, the taxpayer suffered no detriment because he had not incurred any
extra expense or changed his conduct in any way in reliance on the tax law as it
stood before retroactive amendment. 389 Accordingly, the tax was not so "harsh
and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation.''9 The Court
stated: "We can not assume that stockholders would refuse to receive corporate
dividends even if they knew that their receipt would later be subjected to a new
tax or to the increase of an old one."139 1 However, the Court stated in dicta that
Welch would have been a different case if the transaction taxed had been
"completely vested before the enactment of the taxing statute [and if] the nature
or amount of the tax could not reasonably have been anticipated by the taxpayer
at the time
of the particular voluntary act which the statute later made the taxable
' 392
event.

Notice and reliance-or reliability-are key
In Milliken, the gift in
contemplation of death was made anticipating some tax: a different applicable
rate would be unlikely to have determined the donor's giving or choice of

22. "By [the 1916 Revenue Act], Congress had adopted the well understood system of taxation of
transfers ofproperty at death, already existing in 42 states." Id. (citations omitted). Sections 202(b)
of the 1916 Act and 402(c) of the 1918 Act, laid a tax on gifts made in contemplation of death,
computed at the same value and rate as property that had been part of the donor's estate passing
at death. Id. "As of 1916, 29 states and one temtory imposed taxes on gifts in contemplation of
death at the same rate as on estates passing at death." Id. at 22 n.2. Most provided for appraisal
of the property as of the date of the decedent's death. Id.
383. Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 24 (1931) (referrng to the tax at issue as one to
be supported as "an incident and in aid of the exercise of the constitutional power to levy a tax on
the transfer of the decedent's estate at death").
384. Id. at 23.
385. Id.
386. 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
387 Id. at 141.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 148.
390. Id. at 147
391. Id. at 148.
392. Id. at 147

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

donee.393 It is not as transparently clear in Cooper, but the basic idea that one
is unlikely to refuse income because of a different tax rate reconciles the line of
cases. Justice McReynold's limitation of the retroactivity of the income tax at
issue in Cooper to one year394 and the distinction between vested and nonvested wealth made in Welch 395 and the Nichols line of cases 396 makes sense:
absent notice, the taxpayer is likely to, indeed is invited to, spend in reliance
outside such limits. This thinking was confirmed when, after a hiatus of more
than forty years, the Court returned to retroactive tax legislation in 1981.
In United States v. Darusmont,398 the taxpayer unsuccessfully challenged a
retroactive change that increased the minimum tax on a completed sale of real
estate.39 Unlike the taxpayers in the cases from the first half of the twentieth
century,' Darusmont did not actually know of or rely on the relevant prethat when he was considering the
amendment law 40' Darusmont "conceded
various ways in which he could dispose of the Texas property, he was not aware
of the existence of the minimum tax."' 2 Should it have made a difference?
The Court said he had constructive notice: Darusmont was "hardly in a position
to claim surprise at the 1976 amendments to the minimum tax. The proposed
increase in rate had been under public discussion for almost a year before its
enactment. '403 The Court also pointed out that the petitioner was in a far
different position from one who had no reason to suspect that any transactions of
the sort would be taxed at all. 40 4 The 1976 amendments merely "decreas[ed]
the allowable exemption and increas[ed] the percentage rate of tax." '
The final retroactive tax case before Carlton confirms these traditional
jurisprudential themes. In United States v. Hemme,' the Court decided a
challenge on due process grounds to a statute that retroactively applied a tax on
gifts.4°7 Like the taxpayer in Welch, 8 the petitioners did not rely on the
statute in question, and the Court focused on this fact in upholding the

393. Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 18-24 (193 1).
394. Cooper v. United States, 280 U.S. 409, 412 (1930).
395. Welch, 305 U.S. at 147.
396. See Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 442 (1928); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142,
147 (1927); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 538 (1927).
397 See United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 301 (1981) (per cunam).
398. 449 U.S. 292 (1981) (per cunam).
399. Id. at 294-95.
400. See Untermyer 276 U.S. at 440; Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 142; Nichols, 274 U.S. at 531.
401. Darusrnont, 449 U.S. at 295.
402. Id. (emphasis added).
403. Id. at 299 (citing S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 108-14 (1976); H.R REP. NO.
658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 130-32 (1975)).

404. Id. at 300.
405. Id. at 299.
406. 476 U.S. 558 (1986).
407 Id. at 564.

408. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 142 (1938).
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Like Darusmont, the Court held that Hemme had constructive
statute.4
notice. 410 The Court noted that "[section] 2035 had long been in effect at the
time [the decedent] made his gift, and it is [section] 2035 that contains the
principle retroactive feature involved in this case, requiring the estate to reach
back and embrace a gift made over 2 years previously ' '411 Also like
Darusmont, the Court pointed to the implausibility, or lack of detriment, of any
claimed reliance because the taxpayers "still have paid estate taxes of $655.16 less
than they would have paid had the 1976 act never been passed" and thus, "the
retroactive aspect of the law could not be said to be oppressive or
inequitable."4 '
IV THE CARLTON CASE
On October 22, 1986, the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, codified as 26
U.S.C. § 2057, became law 413 Section 2057 provided, inter alia, that an estate
could deduct half the proceeds of a sale of securities to an ESOP from a
decedent's gross estate.F 4 The effect of the ESOP proceeds deduction was to
place half of that part of the estate that consisted of money received from the sale
of securities to an ESOP beyond the reach of the federal estate tax.i 5 Between
passage of the TRA on September 27, and the 99th Congress' adjournment on
October 18, 1986, the legislature considered hundreds of potential amendments
to the TRA. 416 Among the numerous proposed amendments, only one was
related to section 2057--deletion of an extraneous "is. ""' 7 The government has
never disputed that "no bill or resolution was introduced that would have added
any condition to the availability of the new section 2057 deduction other than
those contained m the statute itself during the period between passage of the TRA
and adjournment on October 18, 1986."'4

409. Hemme, 476 U.S. at 570-71.
410. Id. at 571.

411.
412.

Id.
Id.

413. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1053 (1992) (discussing the Tax Reform Act of
1986, 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (1986) (repealed 1989)), rev d, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).
414. 26 U.S.C. § 2057(a) (1986) (repealed 1989).

415.

Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1053. In order to qualify for the deduction under section 2057 of the

Internal Revenue Code, the estate would have to timely file its return after the enactment date of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 2057(c)(1) (1986) (repealed 1989)). Thus,

the filing deadline, not the date of the decedent's death, would determine whether the estate
qualified for the deduction. Id.
416. Id. at 1053.
417. Id.
418.

Id.
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Jerry W Carlton, as executor of the estate of Willametta K. Day,419
specifically relied on section 2057 of the TRA when, on December 10, 1986, he
purchased 1.5 million shares of MCI Communications Corporation at an average
pnce of $7 47 per share, for a total price of $11,206,000.42 Two days later, the
MCI ESOP agreed to purchase the shares from the estate at $7.05 per share,
which was not only below the pnce at which Carlton purchased the shares, but
also approximately twenty-six cents below the average market price that day 42
"'
Thus, the MCI ESOP, a qualifying ESOP under section 2057, 2 purchased the
shares for $10,575,000, $631,000 below the estate's purchase price. 23 Carlton
would neither have bought nor sold the stocks in question, and the MCI ESOP
would not have received a discount, if not for the section 2057 deduction. 24
Carlton timely filed the estate tax return on December 29, 1986, deducting fifty
percent of the proceeds of the sale to the ESOP, $5,287,000 from the gross estate
pursuant to section 2057 425 The section 2057 transaction with the MCI ESOP
saved the Day estate $2,501,161 in taxes.426
On January 5, 1987, the IRS stated in an advance version of Notice 87-13 that,
pending the enactment of a clarifying statute, it would not honor a deduction
pursuant to section 2057 if the decedent had not owned the securities m question
immediately before death (the "decedent ownership requirement"). 42 This
notice was officially published on January 26, 198748 On February 26, 1987,
a bill was introduced in the 100th Congress to enact into law the decedent
ownership requirement.429 Under the caption "Congressional Clarification of
Estate Tax Deduction for Sales of Employer Securities," the bill became law (the
"1987 amendment") on December 22, 1987 and retroactively applied the decedent
ownership requirement as if the original version of the TRA contained such a

419.

Id.

Willametta K. Day died on September 29, 1985, and Jerry W Carlton was duly

appointed executor of her will. Id. Due to a filing extension, not at issue in Carlton, Day's estate
tax return was not due until December 29, 1986. Id. at 1053-54. Thus, m terms of timeliness, the
Day estate was eligible for the section 2057 deduction. Id. at 1053.
420. Id. at 1054.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 1992), rev d, 114 S. Ct. 2018

(1994).
424.

Id.

425.
426.

Id. He then paid a net estate tax of $18,752,250. Id.
Id. at 1055.

427.
428.

Id. at 1054 (discussing I.R.S. Notice 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 332).
Id. Thus, the decedent ownership requirement did not appear in the 1986 version of

section 2057 or in any amendments to the TRA proposed before the 99th Congress adjourned. Id.
429. Id.
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The net deficiency attributable to Carlton s section 2057 claim

was $2 , 5 0 1, 16 1 .43' This was the only deficiency in dispute in the case.432

Carlton paid the total deficiency ($3,385,333) plus interest ($996,953), 433 and
filed a refund claim for the amount of the deficiency attributable to the ESOP
proceeds deduction.434 The claim was denied, and, on October 11, 1990,
Carlton filed a refund action in the United States District Court for the Central
435
District of California for $2,501,161 plus interest, costs, and attorney's fees.
In the district court, the parties agreed to an order narrowing the potential
issues.4 36 The government conceded that under section 2057 as passed in 1986,
the estate was entitled to the ESOP proceeds deduction and that if the 1987
amendment's retroactive application violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

430.

Id. at 1054-55. The 1987 Amendment read as follows:

SEC. 10,411.

CONGRESSIONAL CLARIFICATION OF ESTATE TAX DEDUCTION FOR SALES OF

EMPLOYER SECURITIES.
(a) Intent of Congress in Enacting Section 2057 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
Section 2057 (relating to sales of employer securities to employee stock ownership plans or
worker-owned cooperatives) is amended by redesignating subsections (d), (e), and (f) as
subsections (e), (f), and (g), respectively, and by inserting after subsection (c) the following
new subsection:
(d) Qualified Proceeds From Qualified Sales.
(1) In general For purposes of this section, the proceeds of a sale of employer
securities by an executor to an employee stock ownership plan or an eligible workerowned cooperative shall not be treated as qualified proceeds from a qualified sale
unless(A) the decedent directly owned the securities immediately before death, and
(B) after the sale, the employer securities(i) are allocated to participants, or
(ii) are held for future allocation in connection with
(I) an exempt loan under the rules of section 4975, or
(lI) a transfer of assets under the rules of section 4980(c)(3).
(2) No substitution permitted. For purposes of paragraph (1)(b), except in the case of
a bona fide business transaction (e.g., a substitution of employer securities in
connection with a merger of employers), employer secuites shall not be treated as
allocated or held for future allocation to the extent that such securities are allocated or
held for future allocation in substitution of other employer securities that had been
allocated or held for future allocation.
(b) Effective Date.
The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect as if included in the amendments
made by section 1172 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Pub. L.
431.
432.
433.
(1994).
434.
435.
436.

No. 100-203, § 10,411, 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-432 (1987).
Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055.
Id.
Carlton v. Umted States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2018
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Amendment, then Carlton was entitled to judgment. 37 Carlton conceded that
if the 1987 amendment could be retroactively applied to his transaction consistent
with due process, the estate would not be entitled to the ESOP proceeds
deduction, there would be no other grounds for claiming the refund, and the
government would be entitled to judgment.438

The district court granted the

government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the retroactive
application of the 1987 amendment did not violate the Due Process Clause
because the amendment did not impose a "wholly new tax." 439 The issue of the
constitutionality of the retroactivity of the 1987 amendment could not have been
more clearly presented to the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Courts.
Due Process Standard: Rationality Review-How Not to Balance the
Government Interests and the Individual s Interests
Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court reviewed de novo the
constitutionality of the 1987 amendment to 26 U.S.C. section 2057 440 Unlike
the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not adopt the single standard it had
consistently applied over the past half century to determine whether the
retroactive application of the tax statute complied with due process. 44' Where
the Ninth Circuit weighed the "nature of the tax and the circumstances in which
it [was] laid" in order to determine whether the retroactivity was so "harsh and
oppressive" as to be unconstitutional,"42 the Supreme Court applied the rational
basis test generally applied to "retroactive" economic legislation." 3 The
Supreme Court stated, "[P]rovided that the retroactive application of a statute is
supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means,
judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive
province of the legislative and executive branches
,"4 In defemng to the
legislature under such circumstances, the Court enhanced Congress' powers to
enact, 44inter
alia, retroactive tax legislation and thereby limited individuals'
5
nghts.
A.

437

Id.

438. Id.
439. Id. The district court also rejected the petitioner's Contract Clause and Takings Clause
arguments, and Carlton did not raise those issues on appeal. Id.
440. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2021 (1994); Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055 (citing
Lican v. Commissioner, 946 F.2d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1991)).
441. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2022.
442. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055 (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938)). See
United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 299 (1981) (per cunain). See also Carlton, 114 S.Ct.
at 2022 (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 733 (1984)
(noting that the "harsh and oppressive" standard "does not differ from the prohibition against

arbitrary and irrational legislation")).
443.
444.
445.

Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2022.
Id. (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 467 U.S. at 729-39).
Contra Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) (noting that "[t]here was a time

when the Due Process Clause was used by this court to strike down laws which were thought
unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy").
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Further, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his concurrence, the new standard the
majority applied
guarantee[d] that all retroactive tax laws [would thereafter] be valid. To pass
constitutional muster the retroactive aspects of the statute need only be "rationally
related to a legitimate legislative purpose." Revenue raising is certainly a legitimate
legislative purpose and any law that retroactively adds a tax, removes a deduction,
or increases a rate rationally furthers that goal.'
In other words, the Court equated the standard used for retroactive laws with that
used for prospective laws, ignoring the previously cntical factors of notice and
reliance." 7 But nowhere did the Court acknowledge that it was doing so. The
Court said that retroactive legislation has to meet a burden different from that
faced by prospective legislation; yet it never mentioned what that different burden
might be." 8 The Court stated that both prospective and retroactive legislation
must meet the test of due process and that the justifications for the former may
be insufficient for the latter." 9 Nevertheless, it opined that the rational basis
test is applicable to retroactive legislation.450 How does the rational basis test
or the standard used here differ from one the court would apply to a prospective
statute?
Nature & Circumstances
As might be expected, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit both rejected
451
the notion of a per se rule of invalidity where a statute applied retroactively
The Supreme Court reasoned that, where the original version of section 2057 had
no decedent ownership requirement, "any estate could claim the deduction simply
by buying stock m the market and immediately reselling it to an ESOP, thereby
obtaining a potentially dramatic reduction in (or even elimination of) the estate
tax obligation. 4 52 Of course, that was precisely what the statute plainly
authorized, and it served Congress' purpose of promoting ESOPs. It may look

B.

446. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2027 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See THE
FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 31, at 629.
447 See supra text accompanying notes 393-412. See also Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147
(1938); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1928); Blodgett v. Untermyer, 275 U.S. 142,
147 (1927); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542 (1927).
448. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2022 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1976)).
449. Id.
450. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2024 (1994).
451. Id. at 2026. "The Supreme Court has 'made clear that some retrospective effect is not
necessarily fatal to a revenue law. Thus retroactivity alone will not condemn a congressional
enactment." United States v. Carlton, 972 F.2d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). "We do not doubt the power of Congress to apply legislation retroactively to
the time such legislation was introduced or even to the time such legislation was proposed by the
executive branch." Id. at 1062.
452. Carlton, 114 S.Ct. at 2022.
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irrational to indulge a tax expenditure of $2.5 million to give an ESOP a price
discount of some $600,000, but both the Court's decision and the 1987
amendment merely limited the availability of this irrationality, neither changed it.
But included in the legislative history was a Committee Report statement

acknowledging the clarity of the original section 2057 and claiming it
misrepresented congressional intent: "As drafted, the estate tax deduction was
significantly broader than what was originally contemplated by Congress in
enacting the provision. The committee believes it is necessary to conform the
statute to the onginal intent of Congress in order to prevent a significant revenue
loss under the [TRA]."45" The Court thus concluded that the 1987 amendment
was adopted as a "curative measure" permitting retroactivity45
Characterizing the amendment as a mere cure, however, is not a justification.
To the contrary, it shows exactly the danger of reasoning by labels. Previously,
courts, including the Supreme Court, had approved retroactive curative legislation
that covered prior actions thought by the parties to be legal when taken, but
subsequently found defective because of some collateral problem.455 This same
verbal sleight of hand allowed the Court to ignore reasons for allowing curative
legislation to be retroactive: that parties had erroneously acted in reliance on the
law's being as now revised.45 6 So, the Court simply ignored not only the
executor's lack of notice (constructive and actual), but also the financial burden
the measure imposed on the Day estate ($631,000).457 Moreover, as Justice
O'Connor reasoned, labeling the amendment a cure will always lead the Court to
conclude that the retroactivity served a legitimate legislative purpose:
Every law touching on an area in which Congress has previously legislated can be
said to serve the legislative purpose of fixing a perceived problem with the prior
state of affairs-there is no reason to pass a new law, after all, if the legislators are
satisfied with the old one.45
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit made much of the district
court's argument for validity where the amendment did not apply a "wholly new"

453. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1055. See H.R. REP. No. 391(IH), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1045
(1987), reprinted in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313, 2313-661 (1987).
454.
455.

Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2022.
See, e.g., Charlotte Harbor & Northern Railway Co. v. Welles, 260 U.S. 8, 10 (1922);

United States v. Hemszen & Co, 206 U.S. 370, 382 (1907). Thus, a valid retroactive "curative
measure" has consistently been defined as legislation that applied retroactively in order to meet the
expectations of the interested parties, not of the legislature. See supra text accompanying notes
224-239.

456.

Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2023.

457

Id. at 2026 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Court attempts to minimize the amendment's

harshness by characterizing it as a 'curative measure'
[H]owever, what was done to respondent
here went beyond a 'cure. The retroactivity not only [restored] the tax that Congress 'meant' to
impose onginally, but it caused his expenditures [$631,000] incurred m invited reliance upon the
earlier law to become worthless.").
458. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2025 (O'Connor, J., concurmng).
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tax.159 Both refused to adopt either a per se rule of invalidity or a per se rule
of validity on the grounds that the statute was retroactive and the statute did not
impose a wholly new tax. In considenng the nature of the tax and the
circumstances in which it was laid, the appellate court perceived no "ngid
by
standard of constitutionality in the decided cases" and thus was "guided
the more flexible cntena delineated by the Supreme Court m Welch v.
Henry ,,60
Following precedential tradition," the Ninth Circuit analyzed Carlton on two
factors, notice and reliance:2
From [the earlier retroactive tax cases], two circumstances emerge as of paramount
importance m determining whether the retroactive application of a tax is unduly
harsh and oppressive. First, did the taxpayer have actual or constructive notice that
the tax statute would be retroactively amended? Second, did the taxpayer rely to
his detriment on the pre-amendment tax statute, and was such reliance
reasonable?"63
The Supreme Court rejected its historical approach to retroactive gift and estate
tax statutes,4m dismissing Nichols, Blodgett, and Untermyer as cases decided
during "an era charactenzed by exacting review of economic legislation under an
approach that 'has long since been discarded."" ' With one swift stroke of the

459. See Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1056 (noting that while the Supreme Court's most recent
decisions regarding retroactivity challenges to tax statutes in United States v. Hemme and United
States v. Darusmont did not involve wholly new taxes, the Court thoroughly analyzed the
circumstances of each retroactive application m determining whether the statutes were
constitutional).
460. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1056 (citing Purvis v. United States, 501 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975)).
461. See supra part Il.
462. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. i992).
463. Id.
464. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2021-22 (1994). Here the Supreme Court did
not apply stare decisis. Indeed, the Carlton Court dismissed precedent (the gift and estate tax
cases: Nichols, Blodgett, Untermyer) and instead followed, inter alia, income tax cases, i.e., Welch
v. Henry. Id. at 2023-24. Thus, the Supreme Court rejected its previous analytic bases-indeed
the analytic bases of jurisprudential history on the question of retroactivity-notice and reliance.
These factors had weighed heavily in prior gift and estate tax cases, and in the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Carlton. See Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1928); Blodgett v.
Untermyer, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542 (1927); Carlton, 972
F.2d at 1059.
465. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2024 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)). In
his concurrence, Justice Scalia points out that "economic legislation was not the only legislation
subjected to 'exacting review' in those bad old days." Id. at 2027 (Scalia, J., concurnng). He
questions the Court's rationale for "'discarding' that bad old approach only as to that category."
Id. After all, "the Court continues to rely upon 'exacting review' cases of the Nichols-BlodgettUntermyervintage for its due-process 'fundamental nghts' jurisprudence." Id. (citing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)).
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pen, the Court relieved itself of adhenng to precedent, history, and tradition.
Moreover, in dismissing the Nichols line of cases 466 in this way, the Court not
only relied on dicta stated in Ferguson v. Skrupa,"' but also misapplied that
dicta to the facts of the gift and estate tax cases." s The Ferguson Court
referred to Lochner v New York" 9 and its progeny, cases that involved the
Supreme Court's practice of striking down laws it thought "unreasonable, that is,
unwise, or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy "470
However, in Nichols, Blodgett, and Untermyer, the Supreme Court did not

Justice Scalia wrote:
The picking and choosing among various rights to be accorded 'substantive due process'
protection is alone enough to arouse suspicion; but the categorical and inexplicable exclusion
of so-called 'economic rights' (even though the Due Process Clause explicitly applies to
'property') unquestionably involves policy making rather than neutral legal analysis. I would
follow the text of the Constitution, which sets forth certain substantive rights that cannot be
taken away, and adds, beyond that, a right to due process when life, liberty, or property is
to be taken away.
concurring).
Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2027 (Scalia, J.,
466. See Untermyer 276 U.S. at 445-46; Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147; Nichols, 274 U.S. at 54142.
467. 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (concluding that it is not the judiciary's function to strike down
state laws on policy grounds so long as those laws do not conflict with the federal constitution).
468. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2022 (applying a rational means test usually applied to retroactive
economic legislation, thereby providing great deference to the legislature).
469. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
470. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 729 (citing Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 516-17
(1924) (finding unconstitutional a Nebraska law setting the weight of loaves of bread); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923) (striking down a District of Columbia law establishing
minimum wages for women); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (prohibiting "yellow dog"
contracts)). Lochner v. New York involved a New York law that limited the hours which a bakery
employee could work to 10 per day and 60 per week. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 46 n.1. The Court
struck down the statute as an abridgement of "liberty of contract," and thus a violation of due
process. Id. at 64. The Lochner case is distinguishable from the Nichols line of cases. In Lochner
the Supreme Court did not accept Congress' assertedpurposes for enacting the law, e.g. that bakers
need protection for safety reasons and health reasons. Id. at 57 Instead, the Court only considered
the legislature's actual motive. Id. at 64. Second, the Court did not defer to legislative fact
finding. Id. Finally, the Court required a "close fit" between the statute and the legislature's actual
purpose. Id. at 57-58. The Court stated:
It seems to us that the real object and purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor
between the master and his employ[eels (all being men, sui juns), in a private business, not
dangerous in any degree to morals or in any real and substantial degree, to the health of the
employ[ee]s. Under such circumstances the freedom of master and employ[ee] to contract
with each other in relation to their employment [cannot] be prohibited or interfered with,
without violating the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 64 (emphasis added). Arguably, the Court substituted its laissez faire view of economics for
the asserted will of the legislature.
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For
question the "wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation."471
example, the Court did not hold that it was unwise, unnecessary, or inappropnate
for Congress to prevent revenue loss. 472 Instead, it considered whether the
retroactive feature of each statute, which not only denied the particular taxpayers
the opportunity to comply with the new laws but also caused them to rely
detrimentally on the pre-amendment law, rendered the statutes "arbitrary and
irrational." 4 "

C.

Notice

A common thread that runs through the cases in which the Supreme Court
upheld the challenged retroactive statute is that the taxpayer had either actual or
constructive notice that her transfers or income would be taxed.474 Unlike those

471. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730.
472. See Untermyer 276 U.S. at 444-45; Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 147- Nichols, 274 U.S. at 54243.
473. Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court viewed the harsh and oppressive standard
the same as the arbitraryand irrationalstandard. See Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051,
1056 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The 'harsh and oppressive' standard does not differ from the prohibition
against arbitrary and irrational legislation that [the Supreme Court] clearly enunciated in Turner
Elkhom." (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co, 467 U.S. 717 733 (1984)),
rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994). See also United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2022 (1994)
(stating that while Welch and Hemme used the harsh and oppressive standard, the formulation,
however, "does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation that applies
generally to enactments in the sphere of economic policy" (quoting PensionBenefit Guaranty Corp.,
467 U.S. at 719-20)).
474. See United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 571 (1986); United States v. Darusmont, 449
U.S. 292, 299 (1981); Milliken v United States, 283 U.S. 15, 23 (1931). But see Lican v.
Commissioner, 946 F.2d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that although the statute in question failed
to wam petitioners that their conduct would subject them to increased penalties, petitioners' bad
faith conduct relieved the statute of its harsh and oppressive nature). In Lican, petitioners
underpaid their taxes and challenged a statute that retroactively increased the penalty rate for such
illegal conduct from 10% to 25%. Id. at 692. In upholding the statute, the Court carefully pointed
out:
Here we are not presented with a case in which an individual acted in accordance with the
law as it stood at the time only later to be subjected to a penalty; instead, those subjected to
the increased penalties, like the Licari's knew at the time that they filed their return that they
Under
were not acting in accordance with the law and could be subjected to a fine
these circumstances, we do not find imposition of the increased penalty unduly 'harsh and
oppressive.
Id. at 695. Contra Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1928) (striking down a
retroactive statute where the taxpayer completed gifts after the retroactive amendment was proposed
to Congress but before it was enacted); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927) (striking
down a retroactive statute where the taxpayer made gifts before the provision in question was even
presented to Congress for consideration); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542 (1927) (striking
down retroactive statute where the Court found that taxpayer had neither actual nor constructive
notice that the trust corpus would be taxed as part of her estate when she created the trust 12 years
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taxpayers, Carlton had neither constructive nor actual notice of the 1987
amendment imposing the decedent ownership requirement when he completed the
MCI ESOP transaction in 1986 .475 The decedent ownership requirement was
not part of the proposed amendments that Congress considered before it adjourned
on October 18, 1986.476 The first proposal to amend section 2057 to include
a decedent ownership requirement was not made until January 5, 1987 471
Congress did not consider the bill to enact the IRS proposal until February 26,
1987 478 "Hence, no act of the executive or legislative branch would have given
any forewarning
of the 1987 amendment at the time the MCI ESOP transaction
4' 79
occurred.

The government relied on two fleeting references in congressional documents
in arguing that Carlton should have been put on constructive notice of the
amendment to the TRA.4 8 However, the references merely stated that the
ESOP proceeds deduction would be available to a decedent who sold her
company to an employee group.i Nowhere in the legislative history did it
state that the ESOP proceeds deduction would be limited to such a situation.482
Moreover, of the two references, one was in a pamphlet written by the staff of
the Joint Committee of Taxation in September 1985 48 3 The court of appeals
said, "[T]he pamphlet does not purport to speak for Congress or even a
Congressional Committee, and was prepared over a year before passage of the
TRA. Its value as legislative history is doubtful." 48 In support of its position,
the government also referred to a floor statement made by Senator Russell Long,
"which was at best ambiguous." 4 5 The court of appeals concluded that Carlton
did not have constructive notice that an amendment proposing a decedent
ownership requirement would be forthcoming. 6
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not consider Carlton s lack of
notice regarding the decedent ownership requirement to be material.487 The
before the challenged statute was enacted).
475.
476.

Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2023.
Id. at 2021.

477.

Id.

478. Id.
479. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059.
480. Id. See Brief for the United States at 5 n.7 United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018
(1994) (No. 92-1941) (referencing to both the pamphlet written by the staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation (Sept. 1985) and to Senator Russell Long's floor statement).
481. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059.
482. Id.
483. Carlton v. United States, 973 F.2d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), rev d, 114 S. Ct. 2018

(1994).
484. Id.
485. Id. Judge O'Scannlain, who authored the Ninth Circuit opinion, wrote: "Interestingly,
while the government argues that this statement gave constructive notice to Carlton, the government
itself was apparently unaware of it at the time it filed its brief and only brought it to our attention

on the eve of oral argument." Id. at 1059 n.7
486. Id. at 1059.
487.

United States v. Carlton, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2023 (1994) (citing Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S.
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federal statute can be relied on for planning, nor is any citizen secure from the
perfectly secret law of future retroactive legislation. For very good reason, then,
the court of appeals "flatly reject[ed] the government's premise that a taxpayer
cannot rely on the clear and unequivocal text of the tax code, but instead must
speculate on the unspoken and inchoate intentions of Congress.""5 3
Should Carlton have taken constructive notice from the tax expenditures
involved? The numbers do not suggest it. In the context of other huge tax
incentives to encourage the development of ESOPs-$56.8 billion increasing to
$88.9 billion for fiscal year 199004-section 2057 as first enacted would cost
5°
a mere $1.4 billion,"' an amount that should not have raised any eyebrows. 0
But should a taxpayer contemplating action according to the undisputedly plain
language of the statute have to investigate such econometrics? The Ninth Circuit
stated that, "[E]ven if it were reasonable to expect that before a taxpayer would
take a deduction plainly available to him under the tax code, he would research
the estimated tax expenditure associated with such deduction, the tax expenditure

created by the ESOP proceeds deduction as originally enacted was entirely
plausible."5 °7

503.

Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The federal government

has long sought to promote employee ownership of shares in the employers. Section 2057 was
enacted to induce taxpayers to sell shares at a discounted price to an ESOP thus furthering the
public policy of employee ownership."), rev d, 114 S. Ct. 2018 (1994).
504. Id.
According to the Joint Committee on Tgxation, [t]he tax expenditure for qualified plans is
the largest single item of tax expenditures. For the fiscal year 1986, the tax expenditure for
employer maintained qualified plans (including Keogh plans) is estimated to be $56.8 billion
and this expenditure is projected to increase to $88.9 billion for fiscal year 1990.
Id. (citing STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX REFoRM
PROPOSALs: TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANs (ESOPs) 21 n.29 (Comm.
Print 1985)).
505. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1060. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the total annual
tax expenditure of section 2057 as originally enacted, at $1.4 billion. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, supra note 504, at 21 n.29; 133 CONG. REC. H845 (1987) (statement of Rep.
Rostenkowski); 133 CONG. REC. S2532 (1987) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
506. When compared with $56.8 billion, the total tax expenditure to promote employee
investment, $1.4 billion for the section 2057 program does not appear incredible. Carlton, 972 F.2d
at 1060.
507 Id. at 1060. Carlton would have had to hire an attorney to research the legislative history.
Such research would have been time consuming and costly, and perhaps, inconclusive. Even if
Carlton had done all possible research in 1986, he would have discovered the legislative purpose
(to promote employee ownership) and a variety of other statutes that Congress had enacted for the
same purpose: He would have found legislation dealing with other "qualified plans," including
pension and profit-sharing plans, which had the intended purpose and effect of raising $55.4 billion
for the benefit of employees. Id.
Carlton's research might also have turned up other legislation the federal government enacted
to encourage employee ownership. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 133 (1984) (excluding from taxable
income half the interest from bank loans made to an ESOP in order to finance the purchase of
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96
reasonably nor detrimentally relied on the original version of the legislation.
Unlike those taxpayers, Carlton reasonably and detrimentally relied on section
2057 as enacted in 1986. As the Ninth Circuit stated: "The very fact that
Carlton engaged m a costly transaction for no other reason than the inducement
provided by the new section 2057 makes this case significantly different from
those rejecting a due process challenge to a retroactively applied revenue
law 497 For example, in Welch, the retroactive statute returned the taxpayer to
the position he would have been in had the Wisconsin legislature not been giving
corporations special tax treatment all along.498 The petitioner in Welch had
incurred no out-of-pocket expenses due to the original statute. 499 On the other
hand, Carlton, as executor, relied to his detriment on the original version of
section 2057, losing $631,000. 5°° Unlike the taxpayer in Welch, Carlton was
not returned to the status quo.'
But the problem with the Supreme Court's action in Carlton goes beyond
denying a person who acted in good faith a substantial refund to which he was
entitled. In upholding the retroactive decedent ownership requirement, the Court
sanctioned a legislative strategy accurately named "bait and switch" taxation by
If this strategy is secure from constitutional scrutiny, no
Justice Scalia. 0

496. See Cooper v. United
detriment in having to include
subsequent sale of stock even
United States v. Hemme, 476

States, 280 U.S. 409, 411 (1930) (stating that a taxpayer suffers no
in his or her taxable income the gain denved from the receipt and
where the gain was realized when it was not taxable). See also
U.S. 558, 571 (1986) (concluding there could be no detrimental

reliance where the taxpayer actually saved over $600); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292,
295 (1981) (finding no reliance where taxpayer was not aware of the onginal minimal tax); Welch,
305 U.S. at 148 (noting that the taxpayer did not incur any extra expenses or m any way change
his actions in reliance on the law as it read before enactment of the retroactive amendment);
Milliken, 283 U.S. at 23 (finding that the taxpayer "tak[es] his chances" on retroactivity of the tax
statute).
497. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059-60.
498.

Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 144 (1938).

499. Id. Unlike the retroactive amendment in Carlton, the challenged amendment in Welch did
not require the plaintiff to pay any out-of-pocket expenses but merely to include additional dividend
income in his taxable income. Id. at 143.
500. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1061.
501. Id. at 1059-60 ("The very fact that Carlton engaged in a costly transaction for no other
reason than the inducement provided by the new section 2057 makes this case significantly different

from those rejecting a due process challenge to a retroactively applied revenue law.").
502. See United States v. Carlton, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2026 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). In the
Ninth Circuit, Judge O'Scannlain wrote:
As intended, the Day estate succumbed to the lure and sold shares to the MCI ESOP at a
substantial discount. Section 2057 worked. An ESOP was able to buy more shares at a
lower price than before. Then, when the pnvate actor had completed the socially desiable
action of selling shares at a discount to an ESOP the government reneged on its end of the
deal. It was too late for Carlton to undo his sale to the MCI ESOP The $631,000 was gone
forever, uretrievable.
Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1060.
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required consideration of reliance in conjunction with the plain and unequivocal
language of the statute on which Carlton relied, and consideration of the complete
absence of notice of the retroactive 1987 amendment in determining whether the
statute was constitutional.1 4
Not only did the Supreme Court fail to attach significance to the issue of
reliance, but it also failed to acknowledge that the government's curative measure
cost Willametta Day's estate $631,000. Rather than addressing the issue of
detrimental reliance, Justice Blackmun addressed the issue of the government's
power to tax and the individual's duty to pay taxes.5I" He wrote, "Tax
legislation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal
Then, Justice Blackmun quoted Justice Stone, who
Revenue Code. 5 16
explained in Welch:
Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he
assumes by contracts.

It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government

among those who m some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must
bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive
517
imposition does not necessarily infringe due process
Thus, Justice Blackmun simply ignored the fact that in Carlton the retroactive
amendment had consequences beyond tax liability The retroactive amendment
did "penalize" Carlton for furthering the public policy of increasing employee
ownership. Notwithstanding that the Supreme Court believed the Day estate was
not entitled to the tax deduction under the 1987 amendment,518 at the very least,
the estate still should have been able to recover the money it lost as a result of
complying with the plain meaning of the original statute."3 9
Second, the government argued that selling the shares at a loss was not a
condition precedent to qualifying for the deduction, and thus, it should not have
been a factor in determining whether retroactive application of the decedent
ownership requirement was unduly harsh and oppressive. 2 In theory, the
government was correct. However, in practice, the seller had to provide the
purchaser (ESOP) with an incentive, in the form of a discount, to purchase the

514. Justice Blackmun's statement dismissing reliance also ignores the difference between
relying on the plain meaning of a statute and relying to one's detriment on the plain meaning of
a statute. If the estate had suffered no loss from the sale of the shares to the ESOP, but merely was
required to pay the tax deficiency, then one might say that the Supreme Court's analysis was not
suspect. However, here, the Court's analysis was further suspect because it omitted a material
fact-that Carlton, acting as a fiduciary and thus, trying to benefit the estate by decreasing its tax
liability, took a loss of $631,000 in order to reduce such liability by $2.5 million. Id. at 2021.
515. Id. at 2023.
516. Id.
517 Id. (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1938)).
518. Id. at 2024.
519. See Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 1992), rev d, 114 S. Ct. 2018
(1994).
520.

Id.
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shares from him in a large block rather than on the open market. 2' In order
to qualify for the deduction, the seller needed the cooperation of the ESOP, which
had to certify that it had met certain requirements.522 Thus, the ESOP had
added bargaimng power and it could, and would, demand some part of the tax
break in the form of a discounted share price. Otherwise, the ESOP would not
have helped the estate to comply with section 2057 523 Moreover, the
government conceded that Carlton would not have sold the shares at a discount
and, therefore, the ESOP would not have been able to acquire shares at a discount
without the section 2057 deduction.524
Overall, the Ninth Circuit held that Carlton reasonably relied on the plain
language of section 2057 and had no actual or constructive notice that the statute
would be amended in such a way that would contravene the public policy of
benefitting ESOPs. 2 ' Also, Carlton s reliance was detrimental: the 1987
amendment did not return the estate to the status quo ante. 52 6 The Day estate
lost $63 1,000.527
The government also contended that the transaction was a sham, that it had no
substance. Carlton purchased the shares only two days before he sold them to the
ESOP, and he intended the tax benefit to outweigh the loss.5 28 In rejecting the
government's argument, Judge O'Scannlain wrote:

521.
522.

Id.
Id. See 26 U.S.C. § 2057(e) (amended 1988) (repealed 1989).

523.
524.
525.

Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1061.
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1062. In Welch v. Henry, the taxpayer challenged legislation that retroactively

imposed a tax on certain previously excluded income. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 141 (1958).
There was no evidence that the taxpayer changed his conduct in reliance on the law as it stood
before retroactive amendment. Id. at 148. In upholding the statute, the Court refused to assume
that an individual would reject corporate dividends even if he or she knew that his or her receipt
would later be subjected to a new or an increased tax. Id. "The Court stated, however, that a
different case would be presented where a transaction was taxed that was 'completely vested before
the enactment of the taxing statute, and 'the nature or amount of the tax could not reasonably have
been anticipated by the taxpayer at the time of the particular voluntary act which the statute later

made the taxable event." Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1058 (citation omitted).
The Ninth Circuit literally applied the dicta in Welch. First, the court of appeals placed great
weight on the fact that Carlton's transaction with the ESOP was "completely vested" before
Congress amended section 2057 Id. at 1060. Second, the court of appeals stated that its
conclusion would most likely have been different if before Carlton had completed the transaction
he had notice that section 2057 would be amended. Id. at 1062. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit would
have decided Carlton differently if the decedent ownership requirement had been introducedbefore

Carlton made the sale to the ESOP or if Carlton had completed the transaction before any
statement regarding a decedent ownership requirement was officially published. Id. The court
explained: "The government has a strong interest in capturing within its taxing powers transactions
deliberately rushed through in anticipation of a pending change of law." Id. Contra United States
v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2025-26 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
526. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1061.
527. Id.
528.

Id.
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We disagree. The substance was m the transfer of wealth from the Day estate to
the MCI ESOP The Day estate was $631,000 poorer after the transaction than it
was before. The MCI ESOP now owns more shares than it would have had it only
been able to purchase shares on the open market. The permanently 52
changed
9
position of the parties show that the transaction had substance and reality.
Accepting the government's argument that Carlton's transaction was a sham
would have been tantamount to protecting all of the government's relevant
interests at the expense of all of Carlton's relevant interests. The government
sought to promote employee ownership by offenng a tax deduction to estates who
made "qualified sales" to ESOPs. 530 Then, once the estate made such a sale and
took a deduction, the government avoided revenue loss by denying the
deduction.Sii Under this scheme, the government attained its objectives by
removing the deduction ex postfacto and by leaving the estate in a worse position
than it would have been in had the government never offered the deduction.532
Here, both the government and the ESOP benefitted from "bait and switch
taxation," whereas the estate suffered a loss of more than a holf million
dollars.533 In effect, the government took $631,000 from the Day estate and
gave it to the MCI ESOP "

In summary, the Supreme Court in Carlton found insignificant the features that
hitherto had marked retroactive legislation as suspect. To pass constitutional
muster, a retroactive statute must only be "supported by a legitimate legislative
purpose furthered by rational means,"5 35 precisely the standard applied to

529. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 1992), rev d, 114 S. Ct. 2018
(1994). Justice O'Connor, who concurred in the Supreme Court's judgment, also pointed out that
Carlton's purely tax-motivated sale of stock should not have met with disapproval of the Justices.
Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2024 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Carlton, as executor, properly structured
the "estate's affairs to comply with the tax laws while nmmizing tax liability." Id. In support of
this point, Justice O'Connor quoted Learned Hand:
[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity,
because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Any one
may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one's taxes. Therefore, if what was done here, was what was intended by [the
statute], it is of no consequence that it was all an elaborate scheme to get nd of [estate]
taxes, as it certainly was.
Id. (quoting Helverlng v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)).
530. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1061.
531. Id. at 1059-62.
532. Id. at 1061.
533. Id. at 1060.
534. "[A]cts directly transfemng one man's estate to another" have long been considered
paradigms of unconstitutional legislation. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884).
535. United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2022 (1994) (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976)).
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prospective legislation. 36 The Court found reliance and the absence of notice,
the two features that to this point had differentiated unconstitutional retroactivity,
of little constitutional significance. 537 The Court simply ignored the relationship
between these two elements, and ignored or sloughed off precedents that might
otherwise have mandated a contrary result.
By denying the relevance of these jurisprudential markers of retroactivity, the
Court effectively excluded retroactivity as such from due process review
Without explicitly saying so, and in fact, by sophistry amounting to little more
than verbal sleight of hand, the Carlton Court handed Congress the power to
make the ultimate in secret laws, the law that only the prescient can see, the law
that catches you nunc pro tunc-provided, that is, the statute is not overtly
criminal, and is "supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by
rational means." 538 This case gives the legislature an extraordinary power-or
does it?
CONCLUSION

Demosthenes thought the greatest evil of retroactive legislation was its
appropnation of the power of a previous legislature: if retroactivity is readily
available, then the present, or any, legislature's own power is extremely tenuous,
dependent on the grace of successor legislatures. 39 In this sense, in Carlton the
Supreme Court allowed the 100th Congress to appropriate the legislative power
of the 99th Congress. To be sure, the 100th Congress thought the 99th Congress
had made a mistake, but with the authority the Court has now given, a subsequent
congress can second guess the 100th, the present, or any other congress, for any
reason or none. Legislative power has become as insecure to the legislature as
legislation has become to the public.
Reliance is dependent on notice. One cannot act in reliance on a statute of
which one is unaware. But sensible, justifiable reliance is also dependent on
reliability. It would be foolish to take action in reliance on an unreliable verbal
formula. The greater the consequence of the action contemplated, the more
foolish and the less justifiable is reliance on such a law In Carlton, the Supreme
Court has explicitly denied the significance of notice and reliance, hitherto so
important in precedent and jurisprudential history The due process standard
required of retroactive legislation is indistinguishable from that required of any
other legislation. According to Carlton, a future legislature can change the
present state of the law nunc pro tunc without satisfying any distinctive due
process requirements. This, of course, makes all present law unreliable. To plan
536. Contra Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) ("The retrospective
aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the
justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former.'). See supra text accompanying notes
291-97
537. Carlton, 114 S. Ct.at 2023. Contra Usery, 428 U.S. at 17. See supra text accompanying

notes 291-97.
538.
539.

Carlton, 114 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Usery, 428 U.S. at 16-17).
Demosthenes' Speech Against Timocrates (353 B.C.), supra note 165, at 373.
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one's affairs in reliance on federal statutory law is to put oneself at the mercy of
the whim of a future congress.
Reliability of the law is a most significant virtue. Reliability really lies behind
the doctnne of stare dectsis: if future decisions did not need to be the same as
past ones, we would truly have a government of men, not of laws. Several

justices of the Supreme Court, justices who joined the Carlton decision, have
explicitly acknowledged the importance to the governed of reliability of law as
a basis of stare decisis. Justice Souter has written that consistency in the Court's
decisions on constitutional interpretation is essential to normal personal
behavior."4 If consistency in Court decisions-read by few-is essential to
ordinary (non-planned) behavior, how much more essential is consistency in
statutory language in areas of law in which consultative planning is the norm?
Justice Scalia wrote regarding certainty in statutes, "But the whole point of

540. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867-69 (1992). Justice
Souter wrote:
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in
society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.
The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as
to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare,
comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does
not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution
calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by
accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.
The Court is not asked to do this very often, having thus addressed the Nation only twice
in our lifetime, in the decisions of Brown and Roe. But when the Court does act in this way,
its decision acquires an equally rare precedential force to counter the inevitable efforts to
overturn it and thwart its implementation. Some of those efforts may be mere unprincipled
emotional reactions; others may proceed from principles worthy of profound respect. But
whatever the premises of opposition may be, only the most convincing justification under
accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling
the first was anything but a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of
the principle on which the Court staked its authority mnthe first instance. So to overrule
under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to re-examine a watershed decision
would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question.
A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances would
address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the
Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore
imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe's original decision, and we do so today.
Id. at 856, 867-69 (citations omitted). To suggest that a
intercourse in reliance on Roe v. Wade would be somewhat
persons, such as state legislators, state attorneys general,
indeed rely on that decision, directly or indirectly through

person would have unprotected sexual
out of touch, to say the least. But other
as well as medical practitioners might
legal counsel.
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rulemaking (or of statutory law as opposed to case-by-case common law
development) is to incur a small possibility of inaccuracy in exchange for a large
increase m efficiency and predictability "" Carlton was about the sort of
social behavior-estate planmng-in which reliability of statutory law and
predictability of outcome is at its most important. 2 After Carlton, consistency
in statutory language, and with it the promised "large increase in efficiency and
predictability," has been compromised.
It is difficult to imagine the Court's jurisprudential attitude in Carlton
becoming its accepted, long-term posture. But, as was pointed out by Mr. Carroll
at the constitutional convention in 1787' 3 and often since, the passage of some
retroactive legislation is inevitable, especially legislation having retroactive
How should the Court use the Constitution's due process
effects. 5'
requirements to police retroactive civil legislation?
Had we the power, we would fashion an analysis similar to that adopted by the
Court m Contracts Clause cases, requirng the retroactivity of retroactive
legislation to be both reasonable and necessary to accomplish a legitimate public
purpose m order to pass due process scrutiny under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. t 5 Analysis of what is considered reasonable would focus on
reliance and its precondition, notice. Such a rule would place burdens on both
the government and the governed, the defenders of the retroactive legislation and
its victims.
As always, the first hurdle should belong to the challenger of the government's
action. The victim should have the burden of showing reliance on the state of the
law at the time he took action causing loss. Did he or she rely on the displaced
pnor governing law? Was that reliance justified? Was the reliance crucial to the
action taken? Was the reliance to the victim's detriment? Was it significant?
If the loss complained of was caused by the victim acting in significant and
justified reliance on the existing state of the law, then the burden should shift to
the defender of the retroactive legislation.
We would require the government, in defense of the legislation, to show that
its retroactivity was essential to a significant state purpose, antecedently
determined, and that it was tailored to minimize unfairness to or oppression of
those who might be victimized. 5 6 If the state's purpose in the legislation could

541. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
542. The introductory essay of the Uniform Code Commissioners to the 1993 revision of the
Uniform Probate Code stated that the purpose of the Code was for the "ease of admnimstration and
"Introductory Essay to U.P.C.
predictability of result are pnzed features of the probate system
(1993).
543. See supra text accompanying note 1.
544. See supra text accompanying notes 191-219
545. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247-50 (1978); United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977).
546. In the light of equity as evaluated over history, it would be nice if this could be
'compelling' rather than merely 'significant. However, suggested reforms such as this should
minmize the changes required if they are to be plausibly realistic and not Just utopian.
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be achieved without making the law retroactive, or by making it more reasonably
tailored to its end and minimizing its harmful effects, or if the purpose was not
important, then the loss inflicted on the victim by the retroactive application of
the statute should be held unconstitutional as a violation of the due process
provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Such a procedure would account for almost all the Supreme Court's
retroactivity decisions prior to 1994.-47 How would Carlton come out on this
analysis? Carlton made a very substantial market transaction in explicit reliance
on the state of the law in place s4' This fact was never disputed. That
transaction cost the estate of which he was executor some $631,000.549 This,
too, was never questioned. The burden would then shift to the government:
could it show that the retroactivity of the decedent ownership amendment was
essential to an antecedently determined significant state purpose? That depends
on how one calculates the outcomes and over what time period. Recall that the
IRS gave notice of its intent not to honor the prior statute and to seek an
amendment on January 5, 1987 550 Suppose Carlton had taken his action after
that date: would his reliance on the statute m place have been justifiable9
Hardly ss On the contrary, it would have been foolhardy Thus, justifiable
reliance for estate transactions such as Carlton s was possible only between
October 22, 1986 and January 5, 1987 552 The least deceptive numbers in the
opinions are that section 2057 before its retroactive amendment, would cost the
government some $1.4 billion per annum.55 3 But if one reduces the time period
for action on the original section 2057 to the seventy-five days in which reliance
was justifiable, that cost would have to be greatly reduced, perhaps to Carlton's
transaction alone."s 4 Given this de minmis cost to the government over the
relevant seventy-five day penod-from October 22, 1986 to January 5, 1987-is
the retroactivity of the decedent ownership amendment still essential to a
significant state purpose 9 Even if one could make the stretch by saying it is, was
the retroactivity tailored to minimize unfairness on or oppression of those who
might be victimized? Could the amendment's purpose be achieved without

547 We say "almost" because it would not, for example, account for Untermyer v. Anderson.
See Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 444-45 (1928). See also supra text accompanying notes
350-59.
548. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2018
(1994).
549. Id. at 1060.
550. Id. at 1054.
551. It is thus that our analysis would run counter to Untermyer See supra text accompanying
notes 350-59.
552. This was the date of enactment of section 1172(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See
26 U.S.C. § 2057 (1986) (repealed 1989). See also supra text accompanying notes 305-14.
553. See supra text accompanying notes 504-06.
554. Notice that the rationality of the whole section 2057 with or without the decedent
ownership requirement is not in question: it is clearly irrationalto take a $2.5 million tax cost in
order to give an ESOP a $600,000 market advantage. That irrationality was left intact by the
Court's decision. See supra text accompanying notes 452-54.
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making it retroactive or by making it more reasonably tailored to its end and
minimizing its harmful effects? The answer here is clearly "yes." It would have
been a simple matter to make the retroactivity date only from the time at which
the IRS gave notice to all concerned, January 5, 1987 That would have
minimized the detrimental reliance losses of those who acted m good faith on the
original invitation.
Must that be all there is? When the burden of the argument, the underlying
reason for the repugnance of retroactive legislation, is its "bait-and-switch"
quality, should not the victim's remedy be tailored accordingly 9 One way in
which retroactive legislation could pay "due regard" to its unwitting victims
would be to provide compensation, if not for their full expectation, at least for
losses incurred in justified reliance on the superseded state of the law. Recall the
situation in contract law when the grounds for enforcement is detrimental reliance:
a very common intuition is that damages should be determined in accordance with
their basis, recompense of losses incurred in reliance on the defendant's promise,
Perhaps the remedy for the victim of
not the plaintiff's expectation. 5
retroactivity in legislation should be similarly tailored. Carlton is an example.
If the legislature, despite its many layers of review, was truly mistaken in the
language of section 2057, and so the Day estate should not be injured by its
reliance thereon; damages in the sum of $63 1,000, rather than the $2 million
greater tax break authorized by the statute, would make it whole.
How could a Court achieve such an equitable outcome? Its very suggestion is
likely to bring the instant reaction: statutes are not contracts.556 That may be
true, 557 but much of the justification for statutes as law is very similar to the
justifications for contract: the reliability of statutes and promises makes possible
the future planning essential to modem division of labor and commerce.55 In
those cases in which the same reasons apply, could we not apply some of the
developed contract jurisprudence to statutes? Unfortunately it would seem not.
When interpretation is not in question, a court can only strike the statute as
unconstitutional or allow it to survive intact. On the analogy to contract damages,
the victim of the retroactivity gets expectancy interest damages or nothing.
Reliance damages are not possible.559

555. The classic source for awarding reliance interest damages in a contract action is Goodman
v. Dicker See Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
556. And with it a quote of Justice Stone: "Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the
taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract." Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146 (1938).
557 However the "public choice" theonsts come very close to saying that, for example, a
statute is the product of a deal between legislature and special interest. See Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV 1597, 1603
(1991).
558. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I, 46
YALE L.J. 52, 53-57 (1936).
559. See id. Ordinarily, expectation interest damages is essential to the requirement of
reliability in contracts, and ordinarily it is one's expectation interest that is served by the reliability
of statute law. But just as the are instances in contract enforcement in which reliance rather than
expectancy interest damages are appropriate, so we are suggesting is it with statute law.
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At present, then, courts are forced into an "all-or-nothing" stance.
Constitutional policing through the Due Process Clauses can only knock out the
offending retroactivity in its entirety An equitable compromise in remedy for the
harm inflicted by retroactivity can come only from the legislature itself. But if
a legislature were to recognize the potential for harm by the desired retroactivity
and provide in the statute for reliance interest damages, then a court would not
be compelled to invalidate the statute entirely On the above analysis, the
legislation would achieve its end in a more reasonable way, deliberately avoiding
undue oppression.
An analogy can be found in depression-era Contract Clause cases. 5s 0 In W.B.
Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,6i the Supreme Court struck down a state statute
that changed default provisions on defaulted municipal bonds as impairing the
obligation of contract. 562 But the Court was clearly offended by the statute's
"studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee," and less extreme measures
would have sufficed. 56 3 This was demonstrated a few years later in Faitoute
Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,5" where, to avoid bankruptcy, the
municipality replaced bonds with new ones at lower interest rates and later
maturation dates, but nevertheless worth something compared to the old bonds
which were worth next to nothing.5 65 The Court expressly contrasted the statute
with that in Kavanaugh: because this was "carefully devised, worked out with
scrupulous detail and with due regard to the interests of all creditors, and
scrutinized to that end by the state judiciary," it passed muster under Article I,
Section 10 of the Constitution. 5"6
It would be equitable and appropriate for legislatures to provide a reliance
interest remedy in a retroactive statute for those injured by their justified
detrimental reliance on the prior state of the law Failing that, courts evaluating
the retroactivity of statutes under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments should look with distaste at the extreme position of
Carlton. A more appropriate analysis, justified by a two-hundred-year record of
Supreme Court decisions and more than two thousand years of jurisprudential
wisdom, focuses on the related requirements of notice and reliability In all cases
distinguishable from Carlton, absence of notice and reliance on the prior,
retroactively superseded state of the law should be given due consideration.

560. See T.A.D. II, Note, Revival of the Contracts Clause: Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus and United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 65 VA. L. REV 377 379-81 (1979).
561. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
562. Id. at 63.
563. Id. at 60.
564. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
565.

Id. at 507

566.

Id. at 515. See East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 234 (1945).

